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CAN THE DARK ARTS OF THE DISMAL 
SCIENCE SHED LIGHT ON THE EMPIRICAL 
REALITY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE? 




Litigation involves human beings, who are likely to be motivated to 
pursue their interests as they understand them.  Empirical civil procedure 
researchers must take this fact seriously if we are to adequately charac-
terize the effects of policy changes.  To make this point concrete, I first 
step outside the realm of civil procedure and illustrate the importance of 
accounting for human agency in empirical research.  I use the canonical 
problem of demand estimation in economics to show how what I call the 
“urn approach” to empirical work fails to uncover important empirical 
relationships by disregarding behavioral aspects of human action. 
I then show how these concerns permeate a prominent empirical is-
sue in contemporary civil procedure debates: the changes in pleading 
policy wrought by Bell Atlantic, Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.  
Revisiting my own earlier work, I embed the question of how changes in 
the pleading standard will affect case outcomes in a broad behavioral 
framework that takes parties’ agency seriously.  In the process, I address 
recent critiques, both of the very idea of using behavioral frameworks to 
understand civil litigation policy changes, and of certain aspects of my 
use of real-world litigation data collected by the Federal Judicial Center.  
As I show, these criticisms are straightforwardly refuted on the merits. 
The alternative to taking seriously the behavioral context created by 
the civil justice system—what has occurred so far in too much of the de-
bate over Twombly and Iqbal—is, as one critic of early 20th-century em-
pirical research by legal scholars once put it, “a mindless amassing of 
statistics without reference to any guiding theory whatsoever.”  To do 
better, we will need to take behavior seriously in studying civil litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Normatively relevant—and controverted—empirical claims abound in the 
civil procedure arena: 
 
• “[T]he success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has 
been on the modest side.”1 
• “[A]mendments to the Federal Rules and changes in various judicial 
practices have been designed, for more than a quarter century, to con-
tain or control discovery and enhance the power of judges to manage 
cases throughout the pretrial process. . . . [S]ome believe [these devel-
opments have] enabled defense interests to employ the procedural sys-
tem to avoid, or at least delay, reaching an adjudication of a dispute’s 
merits.”2 
• “All fair observers acknowledge the skyrocketing cost of discovery.”3 
• “[E]mpirical research on discovery conducted over thirty years has not 
demonstrated that it has been a problem in more than a small slice of 
litigation.”4 
 
Yet empirical research in civil procedure is vulnerable to a charge directed 
at the field of empirical legal studies more generally, that it sometimes involves 
“a mindless amassing of statistics without reference to any guiding theory 
whatsoever.”5  This quotation is drawn from an important recent paper by 
Joshua B. Fischman, which advocates Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical 
Legal Scholarship.6  As Fischman sees things, “[t]he fundamental problem is 
that empirical legal methodology lacks frameworks for connecting empirical 
findings with normative conclusions.”7  Concentrating his fire on studies of ju-
dicial citation counts, reversal rates, and interjudge disparities, Fischman argues 
that such studies “conflate the measureable with the good, justifying policy 
proposals on the basis of the measureable objects.”8  In the present Article, I 
both apply and build on Fischman’s critique with respect to one important 
strand of research in civil procedure—pleading standards and the effects of Bell 
                                                
1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
2. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 12 (2010). 
3. Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate Opening State-
ment, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 141, 146 (2009), available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates 
/index.php?id=24. 
4. Id. at 151 (rebuttal of Burbank). 
5. Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 119 (2013) (quoting S.N. Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant, and Yn-
tema: The Scientific Wing of American Legal Realism, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 43 (1979)).  
6. Fischman, supra note 5, at 119 (2013). 
7. Id. at 154. 
8. Id. at 121. 
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Atlantic, Corp. v. Twombly9 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.10 
I focus my discussion through the pleading standards lens for three reasons.  
First, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal touched off a fire-
storm of controversy, much of it centered on empirical questions such as 
whether Twombly and Iqbal closed off access to court by making it harder to 
get to discovery.  Whether for better or worse, that was the point of Twombly, 
at least with respect to antitrust cases.11  Policy makers and stakeholders in the 
civil justice system care about the effects of Twombly and Iqbal—and they 
should.  Second, pleading standard changes provide an excellent field for un-
derstanding how researchers might meet Fischman’s entreaty to “be more ex-
plicit about how they are combining objective findings with contestable as-
sumptions in order to reach normative conclusions.”12 Contemporary applied 
economics is all about making such combinations in systematic ways, and there 
are some straightforward ways in which the study of Twombly and Iqbal’s em-
pirical effects could be improved using methodological insights from this field. 
Third, most empirical studies of whether Twombly and Iqbal have reduced 
plaintiffs’ access to court have fallen into just the trap that Fischman describes.  
As I shall discuss, these studies focus primarily on how one or another measure 
of the Rule 12(b)(6) grant rate has changed.  Unfortunately, measuring this out-
come does not answer the question authors seem to think it does—in Fisch-
man’s terms, the measureable object is disconnected from what even those 
measuring it see as the policy-relevant one.  Much ink has spilled in debates 
over such details as: 
 
• whether it is acceptable to use electronic data bases such as Westlaw, 
or whether cases studied must be drawn directly from administrative 
sources (such as PACER-hosted docket reports or a data base to which 
only FJC authors have had access);13 
                                                
9. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
10. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
11. Id. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to 
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful case 
management, . . . given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in check-
ing discovery abuse has been on the modest side. . . . the threat of discovery expense will 
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceed-
ings.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
12. Fischman, supra note 5, at 154. 
13. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC 
Study Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal (2012) [hereinafter CECIL, 
Waves], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026103.  This paper also critiques work by 
several other authors: Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading 
Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2012); 
Patricia Hatamyar Moore, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empiri-
cally?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010) [hereinafter: Moore, Tao of Pleading]; Lonny 
Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s 
Study of Motions to Dismiss, 2012 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An 
Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 
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• whether pro se cases should be included;14 
• whether prisoner cases should be included;15 
• and how one should account for the possibility that Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions might be granted with leave to amend.16 
 
But those engaged in these arguments about the trees have sped right past 
the forest.  As I have previously argued, rational parties can be expected to 
change their litigation behavior in response to perceived changes in the plead-
ing standard.17  One consequence is that changes in the grant rate by themselves 
generally tell us nothing at all about how judicial behavior has changed as a re-
sult of Twombly and Iqbal.18 
Another important consequence of party selection is that changes in judi-
cial behavior aren’t the only factor of normative interest, because party selec-
tion can have direct effects on litigation outcomes.  For example, an elevated 
pleading standard might cause a defendant to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that 
she wouldn’t have filed under the more liberal Conley v. Gibson19 standard.  If 
such a motion is granted, the plaintiff will lose at the pleading stage under 
Twombly/Iqbal, but not under Conley.That is an effect we should want to 
measure in order to understand the full normatively relevant scope of Twombly 
and Iqbal’s effects. 
                                                                                                             
(2012) [hereinafter Moore, Updated Quantitative Study].  Beyond those stated in the text 
herein, I take no positions on either these studies or Cecil’s criticisms of them.  See also, 
e.g., Cecil, Waves, supra at 3-4 (acknowledging that the FJC authors missed some motions 
and promising to “reanalyze the data to determine what effect this has on our original find-
ings”); Cecil, Waves, supra at 27-31 (arguing that electronic databases likely cause biases); 
David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1214-17 (2013) [hereinafter Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle].  Engstrom 
considers and critiques an even larger set of Twombly/Iqbal-related empirical studies than 
does Cecil.  See, e.g., Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle, supra at 1245 (considering twelve studies, 
including Locking the Doors).  I take no position on Engstrom’s arguments except insofar as 
the text herein states.  See also Hoffman, supra at 35 (showing that the database search con-
ducted by the authors of the FJC INITIAL REPORT missed at least some Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions); Moore, Updated Quantitative Study, supra at 608 ((“[D]istrict court orders ruling on 
12(b)(6) motions in Westlaw are fairly representative of the universe of all such district 
court orders”) (emphasis in original)).  
14. See, e.g., Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 21-22; Hoffman, supra note 13, at 32-34; 
Moore, Updated Quantitative Study, supra note 13, at 639-40. 
15. See, e.g., Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 23; Hoffman, supra note 13, at 32-34; 
Moore, Updated Quantitative Study, infra note 13, at 639-40. 
16. See, e.g., Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle, supra note 13, at 1221-22 (characterizing as 
“strange research design choices” authors’ failure to “adequately distinguish between 
12(b)(6) grants with and without leave to amend”). 
17. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors of Discovery? 121 YALE L.J. 2270 
(2012) [hereinafter Gelbach, Locking the Doors]; and Jonah B. Gelbach, Selection in Mo-
tion: A Formal Model of Rule 12(b)(6) and the Twombly-Iqbal Shift in Pleading Policy 
(2012) [hereinafter Gelbach, Selection in Motion], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2138428. 
18. See Part III, infra. 
19. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
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Thus, those who base policy suggestions—whether to reverse or stay the 
course—on changes in the grant rate perfectly illustrate Fischman’s c ncern 
about “conflat[ing] the measureable with the good, justifying policy proposals 
on the basis of the measureable objects.”20  Ironically, despite the widely rec-
ognized normative relevance of changes in pleading policy, the overwhelming 
majority of studies that seek to measure Twombly and Iqbal’s effects fail Barry 
Friedman’s well-taken admonition: “Normative bite ought to define the prob-
lem, not be an afterthought.  Falsifiable hypotheses should be about something 
of consequence.”21  In the empirical literature on Twombly and Iqbal, the grant 
rate has been the object about which falsifiable hypotheses have been con-
structed.  Yet authors have failed to take seriously the question of whether 
changes in the grant rate tell us anything about the issues of normative concern.  
As to this point, Fischman could not be more on point when he writes that “re-
search should focus on what is important, not what is easily measureable.”22 
The fundamental problem with such civil procedure empiricism, then, is 
not that it lacks normative motivation.  Rather, such empiricism fails to ade-
quately represent the behavioral determinants of normatively relevant positive 
objects.  If parties change their behavior when procedural rules change, then 
understanding the empirical effects of rules changes requires treating party be-
havior as a fundamental aspect of the conceptual framework that guides em-
pirical work.  In short, the facts of litigation are behaviorally and socially gen-
erated, and such facts cannot be usefully studied by pretending they simply 
involve the classical statistics teaching tool of drawing balls from an urn.23 
A core objective of this Article is to show how approaches widely used by 
applied economists can help increase the relevance—both positive and norma-
tive—of empirical civil procedure research.  The point here is not to make civil 
procedure an object of methodological economics imperialism.  Rather, it is to 
take to heart the counsel provided by Fischman and by Friedman.  Empirical 
questions in civil procedure are too important to study as if human behavior 
weren’t involved, just as they are too important to study with data or statistical 
methods that obscure rather than illuminating.24 
In Part I, I provide a brief refresher on the Supreme Court’s pleading juris-
prudence, as well as on the empirical literature that has attempted to study 
Twombly and Iqbal’s effects.  In Part II, I characterize and criticize the a-
                                                
20. Fischman, supra note 5, at 121. 
21. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 263 (2006).  The 
irony is that in writing these sentences, Friedman was actually criticizing positive scholar-
ship concerning the law for failing to take seriously law’s internal norms and concerns, a de-
ficiency that hardly can be pinned to Twombly/Iqbal researchers. 
22. Fischman, supra note 5, at 122. 
23. See Part II, infra, for the relevance of this analogy. 
24. At a minimum, we should avoid winding up feeling like Karl Llewellyn, who de-
scribed his response to early legal empiricism thusly: “I read all the results, but I never dug 
out what most of the counting was good for.”  Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Re-
search Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 403 (1956). 
Spring 2014] DARK ARTS AND EMPIRICAL REALITY 229 
 
theoretical, behavior-neutral approach to empirical research that most such 
studies have taken.  I begin with deliberately far-afield examples—sampling 
balls from an urn and the estimation of a demand function in economics.  These 
examples allow me to abstract from issues that are contested in the civil proce-
dure arena, while still illustrating how a failure to take social and behavioral 
facts seriously can doom the usefulness of empirical work from the get-go.  I 
then circle back to the challenge of measuring Twombly and Iqbal’s effects, and 
the extant literature’s general failure to take changes in party behavior seri-
ously. 
In Part III, I adopt the conceptual framework used in my earlier work, 
Locking the Doors to Discovery.25  That paper takes party selection behavior 
seriously and develops a measure that is empirically informative as to Twombly 
and Iqbal’s effects.  Finally, I conclude. 
I.  TWOMBLY AND IQBAL: WHY THEY MATTER, AND WHY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
CONCERNING THEIR EFFECTS PROVIDES A GOOD LENS 
Pleading, it is said, is the gateway to the courts.26  And since Twombly and 
Iqbal, it has certainly become a controversial gateway.  Twombly and Iqbal 
(in?)famously replaced Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of facts” standard for  de-
termining when a district court judge should grant a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion for failure to state a claim.27  In place of this logical-possibility test for a 
complaint’s legal sufficiency, Twombly and Iqbal have substituted the much-
debated plausibility standard.  Under the plausibility standard, a judge is meant 
to examine the complaint’s non-conclusory allegations to “determine whether 
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief,”28 and this inquiry is sup-
posed to be controlled by judges’ “judicial experience and common sense.”29 
Changes in the pleading standard could easily work substantial changes on 
access to court, the extent of frivolous litigation, and the mix of disputes that 
are litigated.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal spawned 
                                                
25. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2270. 
26. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010) (“Pleading serves as the gatekeeper for civil liti-
gation.”). 
27. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (“In appraising the sufficiency of the 
complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”). 
28. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“In keeping with these principles a 
court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, be-
cause they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  While 
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by fac-
tual allegations.  When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume 
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to re-
lief.”). 
29. Id. 
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widespread concern30 and attempts at congressional override,31 as well as chal-
lenges to the Twombly/Iqbal critics themselves.32  One piece of evidence n the 
importance of Twombly/Iqbal empirics is the genesis of two reports issued by 
authors affiliated with the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”).33  These reports 
arose from requests by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure 
that the FJC “assess changes in motions to dismiss and decisions on such mo-
                                                
30. See, e.g., Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Twombly and Iqbal: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf 
(statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal 
Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened 
Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011); Miller, supra note 2, at 1; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 
26, at 821; Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851 (2008); 
Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Joshua Civin & Debo P. Adegbile, Restoring 
Access to Justice: The Impact of Iqbal and Twombly on Federal Civil Rights Litigation, AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Civin_Adegbile_Iqbal_Twombly.pdf. 
31. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open 
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
32. See, e.g., Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 3, at 145; Barriers to Justice and 
Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Pincus%20Testimony.pdf (statement of Andrew 
Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP); Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Twombly 
and Iqbal: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009), available 
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Garre%20Testimony.pdf (statement of Greg-
ory G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, and former Solicitor Gen. of the United 
States); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 31 
(2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-36_53090.pdf 
(statement of Gregory C. Katsas, former Assistant Att’y Gen.); Daniel R. Karon, “Twas 
Three Years After Twombly and All Through the Bar, Not a Plaintiff Was Troubled from 
Near or From Far”—The Unremarkable Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Re-Expressed 
Pleading Standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 571 (2010); Rich-
ard Marcus, Still Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 557, 
591 (2012) (citing Locking the Doors and erroneously stating that “[t]he premise behind this 
title is that discovery is some sort of universal right, perhaps even a human right,” evidently 
overlooking the epigraph to Locking the Doors quoting Justice Kennedy in Ashcroft v. Iqbal: 
“Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] marks a notable and generous departure 
from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the 
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. . . 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1950 (2009).”). 
33. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL 
RULES (2011) [hereinafter FJC INITIAL REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov 
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Publications/motioniqbal.pdf; JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RES. OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO 
AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES (2011) [hereinaf-
ter FJC UPDATED REPORT], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf.  The FJC is the research and education arm of the 
judicial branch; it was established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §620 (2006). 
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tions over time in broad categories of civil cases.”34 
Given the prominent role that pleading plays in litigation, it is no surprise 
that Twombly and Iqbal have been cited gajillions of times—in more than 
90,000 and 70,000 cases, respectively, as of this writing.  Moreover, a forest of 
trees surely must have been hacked down to print all the scholarly articles writ-
ten about them in the last several years, including many that attempt to measure 
empirical effects of Twombly and Iqbal using the change in the share of Rule 
12(b)(6) motions that are granted (according to one measure or another of 
“grant”).35 
And the Supreme Court’s interest in pleading is not over.  For example, 
one of the two questions presented in Wood v. Moss, argued at the Court on 
March 26, 2014, directly concerns the factual sufficiency of a complaint in a 
constitutional civil rights case.36  Finally, discussions related to Twombly and 
Iqbal plug into a broader debate about the extent and nature of litigation, dis-
covery costs, and judicial policy.  As just one example, consider the August 
2013 promulgation by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure of 
a Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.37  Included in these amendments are various changes to the discov-
ery rules, including ones related to proportionality that are directed at reducing 
the cost of discovery—a major issue in both the Supreme Court’s opinions in 
Twombly and Iqbal and the debates that have followed them.  Over 2,000 pub-
lic comments on the proposed amendments were submitted,38 and many of 
these raise the issue of empirical evidence.39 
                                                
34. FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at vii; FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 
1. 
35. See infra note 40. 
36. Brief for Petitioners at I, Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 677 (No. 13-115), 2014 WL 
173484. 
37. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf.  The 
Advisory Committee has voted to adopt a number of the proposed amendments; see THOMAS 
Y. ALLMAN, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE 2013 CIVIL RULES 
PACKAGE AS ADOPTED (April 18, 2014), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/220077053/The-2013-Civil-Rules-Package-as-Adopted-Thomas-
Allman. 
38. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, avail-
able at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;D=USC-RULES-CV-
2013-0002. 
39. A search of the comments submitted indicates that ninety separate comments in-
clude the word “empirical” (search conducted using string http://www.regulations.gov 
/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=25;s=empirical;dct=PS;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002).  For 
one example, see Stephen B. Burbank, Comment on the Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId 
=0900006481556e36&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (emphasizing repeatedly 
the importance of the methodologically sound use of empirical evidence). 
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A.  The Grant Rate-Based Empirical Literature on Twombly and Iqbal 
There is by now a sizable number of papers that have sought to measure 
the effects of Twombly and Iqbal.40  The most frequent object of measurement 
has been the change in one measure or another of the outcome of Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions.  Sometimes the Rule 12(b)(6) outcome has been measured such that a 
motion is coded as granted if it is granted as to one or more claims,41 some-
times only grants that eliminate at least one plaintiff are counted,42 and some-
times only case terminations count.43  Studies also differ as to how much atten-
tion they pay to whether motions were granted without leave to amend or with 
prejudice. 
Studies have focused on a wide array of case types, though constitutional 
civil rights and discrimination-related cases have received special attention.44  
There has been substantial debate over whether prisoner and pro se cases 
should be included or excluded.45  Some studies present only raw grant rate 
data,46 while others report estimates from multivariate models intended to con-
trol for variation in factors other than Twombly and Iqbal.47  Different studies 
                                                
40. FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33; FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33; Victor 
D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on 
Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH J. RACE & L. 1 (2011); Raymond H. Brescia, The 
Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimi-
nation Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011-2012); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado 
About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Mo-
tions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008); Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of 
Federal Civil Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127 (2012); William H. J. Hubbard, A Theory of 
Pleading, Litigation, and Settlement, (Univ. of Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 663, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2360723 (January 23, 
2014) [hereinafter: Theory of Pleading]); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 95 (2010) [hereinafter Seiner, Pleading Disability]; Raymond H. Brescia and Edward J. 
Ohanian, The Politics of Procedure: An Empirical Analysis of Motion Practice in Civil 
Rights Litigation Under the New Plausibility Standard (May 7, 2013), forthcoming in 46 
AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2013-2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2262068; 
William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with Application to 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2013) [hereinafter: Hubbard, Testing for 
Procedural Change]; Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading 
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Seiner, Trouble with Twombly]; Moore, Tao of Pleading, supra note 13; Moore, Updated 
Quantitative Study, supra note 13. 
41. See, e.g., Moore, Updated Quantitative Study, supra note 13; Dodson, supra note 
40; FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 13-15; FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 7-
8, Tables A-1 and A-2. 
42. See, e.g., FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 17-19; FJC UPDATED REPORT, su-
pra note 33, at 7-8, Tables A-1 and A-2. 
43. See, e.g., Hubbard, Testing for Procedural Change, supra note 40; FJC INITIAL 
REPORT, supra note 33,  at 16; FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 10, Table A-4. 
44. See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 40; Moore, Updated Quantitative Study, supra note 
40. 
45. See studies cited supra notes 14 and 15. 
46. See, e.g., Seiner, Pleading Disability, supra note 40; Seiner, Trouble with 
Twombly, supra note 40; Brescia, supra note 40. 
47. See, e.g., FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33; FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 
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have reported widely varying changes in their measures of the grant rate, both 
within and across case type categories.48 
While authors generally have not been entirely clear about the point of 
studying these changes in grant rates, one relatively explicit declaration comes 
from William Hubbard, who indicates his focus is in “[q]uantifying change in 
legal standards—in the sense of change in the propensity of judges to decide 
cases a certain way.”49  This characterization suggests that Hubbard has in mind 
what I call the “judicial behavior effect.”50  By this term, I mean the difference 
in the probability that a movant would win on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that is 
but-for caused by Twombly and Iqbal (however one measures winning).  As I 
shall discuss in detail in Parts III.B and III.C, infra, the critical problem is the 
potential presence of various types of party selection effects.51  Judicial behav-
ior effects seem to be the focus not only of Hubbard’s work, but of other stud-
ies as well.52 
As I discuss in Part III.B, infra, these studies’ estimates of the change in 
grant rates generally would represent judicial behavior effects only under the 
implausible assumption that there are no changes in party behavior in response 
to Twombly and Iqbal.  Thus, none of these studies should be viewed as provid-
ing a credible estimate of the judicial behavior effect of Twombly and Iqbal on 
any identifiable set of cases. 
Moreover, even if some measure of judicial behavior effects could be iden-
tified empirically, the possibility of party selection effects requires us to know 
                                                                                                             
33; Moore, Tao of Pleading, supra note 13; Hubbard, Theory of Pleading, supra note 40; 
Hubbard, Testing for Procedural Change, supra note 40; Moore, Updated Quantitative 
Study, supra note 13.  
48. See, e.g., Quintanilla, supra note 40, at 5 (reporting an increase of thirty-four per-
centage points in the rate at which black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination are dis-
missed in employment discrimination cases); FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 14, Ta-
ble 4 (reporting increase of 3.2 percentage points in the share of employment discrimination 
cases granting some or all relief to Rule 12(b)(6) movants); FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra 
note 33, at 7, Table A-1 (reporting change of only 0.2 percentage points for employment dis-
crimination cases after following up cases with amended complaints); FJC UPDATED 
REPORT, supra note 33, at 7, Table A-1 (finding increase of 6.2 percentage points in share of 
cases in which Rule 12(b)(6) movant prevailed on some or all claims, after accounting for 
any amended complaints, with much of this difference apparently driven by increase of 
forty-two percentage points among financial instruments cases, which might have been due 
in part to the financial and housing crisis rather than to changes in the pleading standard). 
49. Hubbard, Testing for Procedural Change, supra note 40, at 35. 
50. See Part III.A, infra. 
51. As I discuss in Parts III.B and III.C, infra, Hubbard’s studies are not immune to 
this problem, despite his claims to the contrary.  See Hubbard, Testing for Procedural 
Change, supra note 40, at 38 (“This paper addresses both the selection of disputes into law-
suits and the selection of lawsuits into adjudication.”); Hubbard, Theory of Litigation, supra 
note 40, at 16 (“By limiting my analysis to cases filed before the decision, I was able to con-
trol for selection effects.”). 
52. See Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 46 (in characterizing the FJC authors’ updated 
report and the outcomes-oriented parts of their initial report, for example, Cecil states that 
their purpose was “to assess the reaction of the courts” to Twombly and Iqbal). 
234 STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [Vol. 2:2 
 
more to meet Fischman’s exhortation to “prioritize normative questions.”53  
From the perspective of a given party in a given case, the probability that a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be successful—however that is measured—might 
be the only question of interest.  But from the normative perspective of legal 
policy—of the design of the civil justice system—that is surely not the only 
question of interest, because changes in party behavior can themselves affect 
parties’ welfare.  To even begin to understand the normative consequences of 
Twombly and Iqbal, we must take account of these effects, too.54 
That brings me back to the FJC authors’ initial report, which is the only 
study to date that provides direct evidence on Twombly/Iqbal-induced changes 
in the filing of Rule 12(b)(6) motions.55  As I discuss infra, pre-Twombly and 
post-Iqbal information on the change in filings can be used with grant rate data 
to at least partially illuminate the effects of Twombly and Iqbal—even without 
assuming there is no party selection. 
B.  A Brief Description of Locking the Doors 
In my recent work on this topic, Locking the Doors to Discovery? (“Lock-
ing the Doors”),56 I sought to recast the discussion of Twombly and Iqbal’s em-
pirical effects away from the overly simplistic metric of grant rate changes. 
I argued in Locking the Doors that we should expect a perceived change in 
pleading standards to induce changes in parties’ lawsuit-filing, Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion-filing, and settlement behavior.  Without unpalatable and empirically 
untestable assumptions, such party selection effects render even the direction of 
change in the grant rate uninformative about how judges have responded to the 
change.  However counter-intuitively, a drop in the grant rate is consistent with 
a pro-defendant judicial behavior change.  And an increase in the grant rate is 
consistent with the absence of any change in judicial behavior.  What’s more, 
party selection effects don’t just obscure changes in judicial behavior—they 
have direct effects on case outcomes, too.57 
                                                
53. Fischman, supra note 5, at 154. 
54. Note that even the broader accounting of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal pro-
posed here does not exhaust the normatively relevant domain of questions related to pleading 
changes.  For one thing, it cannot measure all the negatively affected plaintiffs.  And even if 
many plaintiffs are negatively affected by Twombly and Iqbal, in the sense I define infra, 
Twombly and Iqbal might be socially beneficial on net: if the negatively affected cases have 
low enough merit, then it is a good thing for them not to get to discovery.  The question of 
how Twombly and Iqbal have affected case quality is the subject of my work in process, 
which will use case outcomes after the answer and Rule 12(b)(6) stage to try to measure case 
quality effects. 
55. FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 8-12. 
56. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17. 
57. For example, consider a case in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be filed, and 
then granted, under Twombly/Iqbal, but in which that motion would not be filed in the first 
place pre-Twombly.  Obviously the plaintiff would be worse off—and the defendant better 
off—if this case were litigated under Twombly/Iqbal than if it were litigated under Conley.  
Yet I have said nothing about what would have happened if the defendant were to file a Rule 
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In Locking the Doors I showed how existing data could be used to place a 
lower bound—a numerical floor, in other words—under the magnitude of 
Twombly and Iqbal’s negative effects on those plaintiffs who actually face Rule 
12(b)(6) motions under Twombly and Iqbal.58  Using data published in the two 
FJC reports,59 I showed that plaintiffs were negatively affected—a term I define 
precisely in Locking the Doors and revisit below—in a non-trivial share of such 
cases. 
Two relatively detailed critiques of Locking the Doors have since ap-
peared.  One is Joe Cecil’s Of Waves and Water (“Waves”).60  Cecil is the lead 
author of the two FJC-released reports, and while his critique is unpublished at 
present, his views, arguments, and empirical claims are very important to civil 
litigation policy, as he is a senior researcher at the FJC who frequently provides 
detailed empirical analysis to members of the Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  The second critique was published by Professor David Free-
man Engstrom in an issue of the Stanford Law Review dedicated to the 2012 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.61 
Engstrom generously lauds the behavioral framework introduced in Lock-
ing the Doors.62  And Cecil professes “awe” at my purported “skill in extending 
a common theoretical economic model to the pretrial litigation setting.”63  But 
Engstrom suggests that the empirical work in Locking the Doors “is less sure-
footed” than the paper’s conceptual framework,64 and Cecil launches a broad-
side not just against my use of the data in the two FJC reports he co-authored, 
but also against the very idea of using a model-guided framework for under-
standing the effects of Twombly and Iqbal. 
To engage all of these critiques in detail here would render this Article un-
                                                                                                             
12(b)(6) motion under Conley—perhaps such a motion would be granted, even though the 
defendant would choose not to file one.  Thus even when the judge would do the same thing 
in a given case under the two pleading standards, it is possible that Twombly and Iqbal have 
effects on the parties’ well-being through the channel of party selection effects. 
58. See Part III, infra, for more details. 
59. See FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33; FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33. 
60. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13. This paper also critiques works by several other 
authors: Hoffman, supra note 40; Moore, Tao of Pleading, supra note 13; Moore, Updated 
Quantitative Study, supra note 13; and Brescia, supra note 40.  Beyond those stated in the 
text herein, I take no positions on either these studies or Cecil’s criticisms of them. 
61. Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle, supra note 13.  Engstrom considers and critiques an 
even larger set of Twombly/Iqbal-related empirical studies than does Cecil (see, e.g., the ta-
ble in his Appendix, which is titled “Empirical Studies of Twiqbal’s Effect on 12(b)(6) Grant 
Rates at a Glance” and considers twelve studies, including Locking the Doors).  I take no 
position on Engstrom’s arguments except insofar as the text herein states. 
62. Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle, supra note 13, at 1225, 1229 (“Gelbach offers an im-
pressive theoretical framework. . .”); id., at 1229 (“Gelbach’s framework is plainly a huge 
methodological step forward.”). 
63. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 38; one does pause to ponder Cecil’s sincerity 
when he characterizes this endeavor as one of the “dark arts.” Id. 
64. Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle, supra note 13, at 1226. 
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wieldy, so I shall not do so.65  However, I shall respond to Cecil’s critiques of 
various aspects of the modeling approach itself, because this response fits with 
my focus on the broader methodological importance of taking motivated behav-
ior seriously.  As I discuss, Cecil’s attack on the idea of using a model of liti-
gant behavior to guide empirical work is marred by two apparent misunder-
standings.  First, contra Cecil, the model is not a knock-off of the Priest-Klein 
framework, as Cecil claims.66  But more importantly, I shall show that Cecil 
mistakenly equates expositional assumptions that are made to simplify the dis-
cussion of the model with substantive limitations on the framework’s empirical 
implementation.  I shall also respond to one aspect of Engstrom’s critique, con-
cerning the proper unit of analysis in studying the empirical effects of Twombly 
and Iqbal.  Before I address these critiques, however, I shall nail down some 
key methodological points. 
II.  BEHAVIORALLY INDIFFERENT EMPIRICS HAS URNED ITS RETIREMENT67 
Generations of statistics students have been introduced to ideas related to 
statistical sampling using one form or another of an “urn problem.”68  In a sim-
ple example of such a problem, a collection of B blue balls and R red balls are 
contained in an urn; see Figure 1 for a picture of an urn.  For some reason a 
statistician is interested in determining the fraction—call it π—of balls that are 
blue.69  A ball is selected—sampled, to be more clinical—from the urn, its color 
is recorded, it is put back into the urn, and this procedure is repeated N times.  
It is usually assumed that sampling of balls from the urn is done (i) randomly, 
so that every ball has the same probability of selection on every draw, and (ii) 
independently, so that what happens on one draw provides no information 
about what will happen on the next draw, given the numbers of red and blue 
balls in the urn.  The recorded data are used to estimate π, usually by taking the 
number of sampled balls that are blue, and dividing it by the total number of 
draws from the urn.  This estimator, known as the sample proportion, has desir-
able properties: it is unbiased70 and consistent71 for the true proportion π, as-
                                                
65. Interested readers should see Jonah B. Gelbach, Can We Learn Anything About 
Pleading Changes From Existing Data? INTL. REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming), where I re-
spond to these arguments in detail. 
66. See Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 38 & n.137, 44 (citing George L. Priest & Ben-
jamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)) (stating 
that Locking the Doors “is derived” from the “Priest/Klein model of litigation” and that 
Locking the Doors “adapts a common economic model of litigation”). 
67. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (“[A]fter puzzling the 
profession for 50 years, [Conley v. Gibson’s ‘no set of facts language’] has earned its retire-
ment.”). 
68. See, e.g., Urn Problem, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urn_problem (last 
visited May 26, 2014) (discussing urn problems). 
69. That is, π=B/(B+R). 
70. An estimator  is unbiased for population value π if E( ) = π, i.e., if the estima-
tor’s expected value equals the population value. This means that on average, the estimator 







Spring 2014] DARK ARTS AND EMPIRICAL REALITY 237 
 
ymptotically normal,72 and asymptotically efficient in the class of consistent 
estimators.73 
 














Source: Maya Funerary Urn, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Maya_funerary_urn.jpg (last 
visited June 2, 2014).  
                                                                                                             
71. Roughly speaking, an estimator  is consistent for population value π if it is as-
ymptotically unbiased, which means that as the sample size grows without bound, the prob-
ability converges to 0 that  and π will differ by more than a stated magnitude, for any 
choice of that magnitude (formally, P(| |). Consistency is a frequently used property be-
cause, while many estimators are biased in finite samples, it can be shown that their bias 
converges to zero as the sample size grows.  An implication is that when the sample size is 
large enough, bias will be trivially small.  How large is large enough is a tricky question, and 
one that is beyond the scope of this paper.  The sample proportion is a special case in which 
consistency follows because of unbiasedness.  More generally, consistency of estimators fol-
lows, when it does, from artful application of one or another law of large numbers.  See, e.g., 
HALBERT WHITE, ASYMPTOTIC THEORY FOR ECONOMETRICIANS (2001). 
72. An estimator  is asymptotically normal if, when its mean is π, the probability 
distribution of  converges to a normal (bell curve) distribution as the sample 
size N increases without bound.  Roughly speaking, this means that for large enough sample 
sizes, one can use the normal distribution to analyze the behavior of the statistic X even 
when  itself is not normally distributed for any given sample size N. Asymptotic normal-
ity of an estimator usually follows, when it does, from artful application of one or another 
central limit theorem.  See, e.g., id. 
73. An estimator is efficient in a class if it has the least variance among all estimators 
in that class.  An estimator such as the statistic X in note 72, supra, is asymptotically effi-
cient in a class if, as the sample size increases without bound, its variance converges to a 
value that is the least such convergent value among all estimators in the class in question.  
Under simple random sampling, the asymptotic efficiency of the urn sample proportion fol-
lows from the fact that the sample proportion can be shown to equal the maximum likelihood 
estimator, which is well known to achieve the lowest possible asymptotic variance in the 
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One useful point of emphasis is that even in the simple urn-sampling case, 
we needed some assumptions about the selection mechanism used to choose 
balls to say much of anything statistically sensible.74  On the other hand, with 
the assumptions of random and independent sampling, we can say quite a lot 
about this proportion.  A first lesson, then, is that statistical assumptions—by 
which I mean assumptions about the way observed data find their way into the 
analysts’ sights—can be very important. 
When the commonly used baseline assumption of random sampling cannot 
be maintained, learning much at all about the object of estimation requires 
some knowledge concerning the actual way in which observations wind up in 
the researchers’ hands.  For example, there are good reasons to believe that 
those researchers who create their Twombly/Iqbal study samples using searches 
of electronic databases may be sampling in nonrandom ways.75  Violations of 
the independence assumption also can have important effects, though I shall not 
dwell on them here.76 
A second question, though, is: so what—who cares how many balls in an 
urn are blue or red?  The urn problem almost invariably is a modeling con-
struct.  Just as law professors, practicing lawyers, and judges use fanciful hy-
potheticals to isolate legal issues of special interest, good statisticians use the 
urn problem, and others like it, to abstract from aspects of complex and contex-
tualized real-world questions that are not fundamentally statistical in nature, in 
order to focus on the aspects of those questions that are amenable to statistical 
analysis.  No one really cares about blue balls in urns.  Rather, we represent 
real-world objects of interest, many of them abstract, using simple statistical 
analogues, because doing so clarifies the aspects of an empirical study that in-
volve randomness, estimation, and inference.  But human beings are not blue or 
red balls.  They have motivations, and they have agency, and that has important 
implications for empirical research, including empirical research on legal pol-
                                                
74. To be precise, even without the random-sampling assumption, we can definitely 
say at least one thing, and possibly two things.  First, if a blue ball is drawn at least one time, 
then we can say for sure that the true fraction of blue balls in the urn is at least as great as 
1/(1+R).  Second, if at least one red ball is drawn, then we can say for sure that the true frac-
tion of blue balls is no greater than B/(B+1).  These values operate, respectively, as lower 
and upper bounds on the true proportion π.  The example as I laid it out involved sampling 
with replacement (we put the selected ball back in the urn after recording the result of each 
draw).  If sampling had been done without replacement, then lower and upper bounds would 
be more informative, since the minimum number of blue balls in the urn would have to be at 
least the number of selected blue balls, and analogously for the number of red balls. 
75. See FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33; Cecil, Waves, supra note 13; Moore, Up-
dated Quantitative Study, supra note 13; Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle, supra note 13. 
76. See, e.g., A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach, & Douglas L. Miller, Bootstrap-
Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 414 
(2008); Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We 
Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates? 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004); A. Colin Cameron, 
Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering, 29 J. 
BUS. & ECON. STAT. 238 (2011). 
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icy.  Thus, failing to take human behavior’s motivated agency into account—
treating outcomes of human behavior as simply so many urn-sampled balls—
can be fatal to the relevance of empirical research concerning legal rules and 
institutions. 
To be clear, I do not mean to criticize the classical urn approach to statisti-
cal analysis.  The vast majority of quantitative empirical work will have some 
irreducibly statistical component.  Part of the art of doing good empirical work 
is figuring out where the behavioral model stops and the purely statistical work 
takes over.77  But a failure to take seriously the behavioral nature of data on 
humans can be disastrous in empirical research.  To illustrate this point, I now 
turn to a classic example that every student of econometrics confronts. 
A.  Behavioral Challenges Illustrated: Estimating a Demand Function 
Suppose the price of some good is given by P and the logarithm of quantity 
demanded is given by QD,78 and suppose the good’s demand function is 
QD=α + P×β + εD. 
Here, α and β are, respectively, the demand function’s intercept and slope 
parameters, and εD is a random element that captures variation in quantity de-
manded arising from unobserved factors.  The theory of demand tells us that, 
except in freak cases, the parameter β can be expected to be negative—when a 
good’s price rises, people generally want to buy less.79  Let us further assume 
                                                
77. I suspect that every empirical study can be viewed as dividing its analysis into 
separable components that involve purely statistical and purely substantive, non-statistical 
aspects even though users of statistics of course study more than urns.  They also study 
things like the estimation of the population mean of a continuous random variable—
something that is relevant when estimating the average level of income in a country, or the 
average level of damages awarded to prevailing tort plaintiffs in litigation.  See, e.g., David 
A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Charles Silver, & William M. Sage, Estimating the Effect of 
Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
355 (2009).  And many questions that involve discrete random variables, such as the binary 
outcome of whether an appellate judge votes for the plaintiff or defendant, usually are mod-
eled as involving numerous covariates—not just the simple up-or-down outcome that could 
be directly analogized to the urn problem.  See e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & An-
drew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 389 
(2010)); Joshua B. Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interac-
tions Framework, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming). 
78. Economists sometimes use the logarithm of quantity for a variety of reasons. Here 
I do so since it allows the measure of quantity to take on any real-number value, allowing the 
random element to have a normal distribution; this assumption is purely for exposition—
dropping it would complicate the discussion without changing any substantive conclusion. 
79. The freak cases are those in which the good is a Giffen good.  See Alfred Marshall, 
3 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS Ch.VI, ¶ III.VI.17 (1895).  In contemporary terms, imagine a 
poor law student with $21 to spend per week on dinner.  He eats ramen noodles 6 nights a 
week, at a price of $2 per box, and on the seventh night he eats a $9 pizza.  Now imagine a 
labor strike in the ramen industry causes a supply constriction, raising the price of ramen 
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that all data are observed at the market level—say, by counties—and that the 
random element εD is normally and independently distributed across counties, 
with mean zero.  Finally, let us assume that we have a random sample of 
county-level data on the quantity and price of our good. 
Along comes a statistician well-trained in the urn approach—the approach 
of modeling observed data in terms that (i) fit textbook statistical models but 
(ii) do not account for the human, behavioral factors that help determine the 
values of observed variables.  Such a statistician might use the ordinary least 
squares estimator—sometimes called “running a regression”—to estimate α 
and β, noting on the side that she is making the usual assumption that the ran-
dom element εD is uncorrelated with the independent variable (here, price).  For 
simplicity, suppose the statistician observes data for just two types of counties.  
In counties of type 1, observed quantity and price are given by Q1 and P1, as in 
Figure 2.  In counties of type 2, observed quantity and price are given by Q2 
and P2.  The result of our statistician’s use of ordinary least squares would be to 
determine that the estimated relationship between quantity and price is given by 
the dashed line in Figure 2.  Assuming the estimated slope is statistically sig-
nificant, our statistician would probably conclude that the data reject the theory 
of demand, since the estimated line has a positive slope, which is the wrong 
sign under the theory.  And our statistician would be committing a major mis-
take. 
 
                                                                                                             
noodles to $3 per box.  After purchasing 6 boxes of ramen noodles at this price, our law stu-
dent now has only $3 left for the seventh night—not enough for a pizza, but just enough for 
another box of ramen.  Thus, an increase in the price of ramen noodles from $2 to $3 causes 
the student’s quantity demanded to rise from 6 boxes to 7.  (Notice that this example de-
pends importantly on the absence of some alternative to ramen—if mac ’n cheese were $2 
per box and unaffected by the ramen strike, perhaps our student would shift demand from 
ramen to mac ’n cheese when the former’s price rose.) 
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Figure 2: Hypothetical Observed Price and Quantity Data  
 
The problem is that demand is just half the story.  Economists assume that 
supply matters, too, and that prices and quantities are determined jointly by 
supply and demand.  Suppose, again for exposition only, that the supply func-
tion is also log-linear: 
QS=γ + P×δ + εS, 
where QS is the logarithm of the quantity supplied, γ and δ are, respectively, 
the supply function’s intercept and slope parameters, and εS is a random ele-
ment that captures variation in quantity demanded arising from unobserved 
causes. 
If market forces are allowed to determine price and quantity, then the price 
will be determined where the quantities demanded and supplied are equal.  Af-
ter setting quantity demanded and quantity supplied equal, it can be shown that 
among other things, the equilibrium price depends on the random element εD.80  
                                                
80. Specifically, it can be shown that whenever , we will have 
€ 
DQ = SQ
Anuja Thatte   6/2/14 2:43 PM
Comment:  
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In particular, when quantity demanded is higher for random reasons—when εD 
is greater—the demand curve shifts out, pushing up both equilibrium price and 
equilibrium quantity, as illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 3.  In this graph, the 
demand curve is negatively sloped, but there is a positive relationship between 
observed price and quantity because county 2’s demand curve has shifted out 
more than its supply curve, by comparison to county 1. 
 
Figure 3: Two Hypothetical Cross-Market Relationships Between Quan-
tity and Price, in Which the Relationships Between Price and Quantity 
Supplied/Demanded Are the Same 
 
Now consider Panel (b) of Figure 3.  There, we see the opposite situation 
from Panel (a): county 2’s supply curve has shifted out more than the demand 
curve has.  Consequently, in Panel (b) we observe a negative relationship be-
tween price and quantity.  But notice that all demand curves in the two Panels 
have the same slope, as do all supply curves.  Thus, neither Panel’s observed 
relationship between price and quantity tells us anything useful about the pa-
rameters of the demand and supply curves.81  It simply makes no sense to use 
this sort of approach to test the theory of demand, or to estimate demand and 
supply curves. 
There are really two aspects of the problem here.  First, our statistician’s 
objective is poorly defined.  It is unclear what it means to study “the causal re-
                                                                                                             
,
 
so that greater values of the demand shock εD are associated with greater values of equilib-
rium price, while greater values of the supply shock εS are associated with lower equilibrium 
price values. 
81. That is, about α, β, γ, or δ. 
€ 
P = α − γ
δ − β
+ Dε − Sε
δ − β
(a) (b) 
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lationship between price and quantity” in the absence of a behavioral frame-
work.  This problem is addressed by adopting and working within the theory of 
supply and demand—or, perhaps, some other behavioral model that the re-
searcher is willing to defend in explicit terms. 
The second aspect of the problem is evident once we posit a clear behav-
ioral framework—in this case, the theory of demand and supply in competitive 
markets.  The discussion above—and especially Figure 3—show that the sim-
ple relationship between observed county-level quantity on observed county-
level price cannot identify either the demand curve or the supply curve.  Only 
by finding a way to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in supply and de-
mand—the εD and εS terms above—can an empirical researcher hope to validly 
estimate the demand and supply curves in a competitive market.  Since these 
curves work together to determine price and quantity, only an approach that ac-
counts for both supply and demand can uncover the actual causal relationships 
that connect the observed variables of price and quantity. 
To be clear, the problem here isn’t that demand and supply are never esti-
mable; economists long ago devised methods to deal with the unobserved het-
erogeneity problem, and these methods have been among the core techniques 
taught in econometrics courses for many decades.82  Instead, the problem is a 
mismatch between the urn approach to statistical analysis and the human, be-
havioral choices that determine the values of the observed variables.  The take-
away point here is that properly understanding the empirical determinants of 
price and quantity requires more than just a theoretical statistical analysis—it 
requires serious attention to the behavioral origins of data on humans.   
 Similarly, empirical facts about the civil justice system may fail the rele-
vance test if they are not interpreted within a behavioral framework.  Thus, a 
critical step in policy-relevant empirical work is to consider clearly what be-
havioral possibilities are analytically admissible.  In the foregoing discussion, 
for example, the behavioral possibilities include the possibility (to most 
economists, the inevitability) that a good’s price and quantity will be deter-
mined together by the interaction of producers and consumers as reflected by 
supply and demand.  Similarly, in the case of studying the effects of Twombly 
and Iqbal, as I shall discuss in the next Part, the general set of possibilities in-
cludes the specific possibility that parties will change their behavior in response 
to perceived changes in the pleading standard. 
When a researcher allows for a particular behavioral possibility, she signs 
up for the obligation to develop an identification strategy that is capable of un-
                                                
82. The usual approach is to find observable instrumental variables, each of which 
plausibly shifts either the demand curve or the supply curve, but not both.  An instrument 
that shifts the demand curve helps identify the parameters of the supply curve, while one that 
shifts the supply curve helps identify the parameters of the demand curve.  See, e.g., Joshua 
D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: 
From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (2001), for an ac-
cessible discussion of instrumental variables in this context. 
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covering useful empirical information when the behavioral possibility in ques-
tion might occur.  The term “identification strategy” is widely used in applied 
econometrics, but so far as I know it does not have a widely agreed formal 
definition.  To be clear, by “identification strategy” I shall mean a set of behav-
ioral assumptions, statistical assumptions,83 data sources, and estimation meth-
ods that can be used together to estimate an empirical object of interest. 
It is important to recognize that stronger behavioral assumptions may allow 
researchers to claim identification of more objects of empirical interest.  Con-
versely, it often is the case that a researcher’s claims of identification rely on 
strong behavioral assumptions.  This latter point is especially important to rec-
ognize because the key behavioral assumptions are all too often left unstated.  
Consider again our hypothetical statistician who wants to estimate the causal 
relationship between price and quantity.  As we saw above, when the theory of 
demand and supply is correct, the observed relationship between price and 
quantity generally will not identify either the demand curve or the supply 
curve.  Once again, the problem is that observed co-movements in quantity and 
price are affected by unobservable factors causing market-level variation in the 
location of both curves: variation in the intensity of potential buyers’ desires for 
the good shift the demand curve, while variation in production costs shift the 
supply curve. 
There are, however, special cases under which the statistician’s estimation 
approach described above does yield valid estimates of something of interest.  
For example, suppose there is no unobserved heterogeneity across counties in 
the location of the demand curve—which is to say, no variation in εD.  In that 
case, the only source of variation in price and quantity must be cross-county 
shifts in the supply curve.  As Figure 4 illustrates, the observed relationship be-
tween price and quantity identifies the demand curve in this situation.  Thus, a 
statistician who claims to test the theory of demand by using only data on the 
observed cross-market price-quantity relationship could justify this approach by 
clearly embracing the assumption that the location of the demand curve does 
not vary across counties.  In general, few would consider such an assumption 
reasonable.  And that is one reason why it is so important to be clear about be-
havioral assumptions: strong and even unreasonable assumptions are often hid-
den, lurking just beneath the veneer of an intuitive-seeming empirical approach. 
 
                                                
83. To be even clearer, by “statistical assumptions” I mean assumptions that character-
ize “all of the random influences that combine together to lead to individual observations” 
(this specific quotation comes from Data Generating Process, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_generating_process (last visited May 8, 2014)). 
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Figure 4: Identification of the Demand Curve when Only the Supply 
Curve Varies Across Markets 
 Consider William Hubbard’s two studies on Twombly and Iqbal.  Hubbard 
claims to estimate the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissal rates—what I 
call judicial behavior effects—and he claims to do so while “control[ling] for 
selection effects.”84  In his first study, Hubbard attempts to study the effects of 
Twombly alone (i.e., he does not try to study Iqbal’s effects) by comparing (i) 
measures of the grant rate using only cases filed in the forty-five-day period 
just before the Supreme Court released the Twombly decision to (ii) measures 
of the outcomes for cases filed in the same calendar period a year earlier.85  
Hubbard’s reason for isolating these “straddle cases”86 is that “if the plausibility 
standard announced in Twombly led many plaintiffs not to file suit at all, it is 
possible that the share of filed cases being dismissed may not change, even 
though many (potential) plaintiffs are nonetheless losing their day in court.”87  
                                                
84. See Hubbard, Testing for Procedural Change, supra note 40; Hubbard, Theory of 
Pleading, supra note 40, at 16. 
85. See Hubbard, Testing for Procedural Change, supra note 40, at 55-56. 
86. So far as I know, the term “straddle cases” was coined by Engstrom, supra note 61, 
at 1224. 
87. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, supra note 40, at 15-16. 
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By including only cases filed before Twombly, it is possible that Hubbard suc-
cessfully eliminated any such plaintiff selection effects.88 
But Hubbard’s approach does nothing to eliminate the problems of defen-
dant selection and settlement selection, since Twombly’s occurrence was know-
able to all parties within a short period of time after case filing.89  As I show in 
Part III.B, infra, these types of selection are themselves sufficient to render the 
change in the grant rate generally uninformative about changes in judicial be-
havior.  In other words, eliminating plaintiff selection is an insufficient identifi-
cation strategy, on its own, to tell us anything of interest about Twombly and 
Iqbal’s effects. 
As appealing as Hubbard’s approach might seem, it controls for only plain-
tiff selection effects.  Thus Hubbard’s claim to having identified judicial behav-
ior effects relies on the important, unstated assumption that defendant selection 
and settlement selection effects either don’t exist or don’t matter empirically if 
they do.  This example illustrates the dangers of failing to clearly consider and 
state the assumptions guiding empirical work generally, and thus also in civil 
procedure: the fact that assumptions aren’t discussed doesn’t mean they aren’t 
doing important work. 
B. The Absence of Party Selection as a Behavioral Restriction 
The problem of hidden assumptions in estimating the effects of Twombly 
and Iqbal is certainly not limited to the point I have just made about Hubbard’s 
work.  Any identification strategy directed at learning something meaningful 
about pleading standard changes using only the change in the grant rate neces-
sarily includes behavioral restrictions on the extent of party selection.  Conse-
quently, researchers who claim that changes in the grant rate, on their own, tell 
us something useful about the effects of Twombly and Iqbal must shoulder the 
burden of explaining the behavioral restrictions on party selection effects on 
which they are relying.  Unfortunately, this has not generally been the way of 
things in the literature on Twombly and Iqbal.  I have already noted, for exam-
ple, that William Hubbard’s approach plausibly eliminates only plaintiff selec-
tion effects, leaving implicit his apparent assumption that there are neither de-
fendant selection nor settlement selection effects.90 
Cecil takes an even more problematic approach.  He states that he has “no 
quarrel” with the proposition that there is defendant selection,91 and he also al-
                                                
88. That said, it plaintiffs could voluntarily dismiss their suits via Rule 41 when faced 
with Rule 12(b)(6) motions that they did not expect to face at the time they filed suit; thus it 
is possible that some plaintiff selection effects remain even in Hubbard’s data 
89. I provide a detailed discussion of “surprise” cases, in which the parties are sur-
prised to find a new pleading standard in place after the plaintiff files suit, in Part V of Jonah 
B. Gelbach, Can We Learn Anything About Pleading Changes from Existing Data?  INTL. 
REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming). 
90. See Part A, supra. 
91. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 42. 
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lows the possibility that there are both plaintiff and settlement selection ef-
fects.92  Thus Cecil accepts that all three forms of party selection effects might 
occur, and he does not make any assumptions that would restrict the magnitude 
of any of them.  But Cecil also insists that in using the change in the grant rate 
to measure the effects of Twombly and Iqbal, his co-authored studies “provide[] 
the best estimate[s] of the federal district courts’ responses to these deci-
sions.”93  Here one can only cry, foul.  Given that one has accepted the empiri-
cal correctness of a premise, logic dictates that one must also accept as sound 
the conclusion of any valid argument starting from that premise.  Something 
must go: either Cecil must withdraw his endorsement of grant rate compari-
sons, or he must endorse a set of restrictions on party selection strong enough 
to make such comparisons informative. 
For readers who are unfamiliar with thinking through the role of behavioral 
assumptions in identifying empirical objects of interest, perhaps it will be help-
ful to be a bit more concrete.  Here is a simple statement of one possible behav-
ioral restriction: parties do not change their behavior following perceived 
changes in the pleading standard.  That is, the pleading standard has no impact 
on whether plaintiffs file suit, nor on whether defendants file Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions in cases plaintiffs have filed, nor on whether cases settle before the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage.  As I discuss in Part III.B, if this restriction is true, the change in 
the grant rate could tell us something important—namely, how judicial behav-
ior has changed as a result of Twombly and Iqbal.94  I do not think anyone seri-
ously believes this “no-selection” behavioral restriction to be accurate; cer-
tainly, no one has proudly pledged allegiance to it. 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that behavioral restrictions are unac-
ceptable—quite the contrary.  Such restrictions are unavoidable if we are to use 
data to learn about the world: if absolutely any behavioral response to a change 
in the pleading standard could happen, then there will be no way to learn any-
thing about its effects from any data.  Behavioral assumptions are necessary, 
and we all make them all the time in our daily lives.  For example, you cross a 
heavily trafficked street when the walk sign is illuminated because you think 
that motorists will not run a red light.  That is a behavioral assumption, and an 
obviously important one—if you’re wrong, very bad things very possibly will 
happen to you. 
One strand of the discussion here may be summarized using what I call the 
“no blood from a behavioral stone” principle of empirical work. Without any 
assumptions on human behavior, one simply cannot learn anything of policy 
                                                
92. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 42 & nn. 138-39 (“(“[A]n increase in motions by 
defendants may be caused by a drop in the rate at which cases settle. . . . [O]ur ‘filings’ 
dataset would also include any plaintiff selection effects. . . . Sorting out the contributions of 
the ‘plaintiff selection effect’ and the ‘settlement selection effect’ is a difficult task.”). 
93. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 46. 
94. To be sure, other assumptions would still be necessary, such as that the case mix 
did not change, in empirically important ways, for reasons unrelated to changes in the plead-
ing standard. 
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importance.  Of course researchers should strive to make the least restrictive 
assumptions that allow empirical research to answer normatively relevant ques-
tions.  But statements like “that method requires assumptions” are beside the 
point, because any empirically informative approach requires assumptions.  
The alternative to one set of assumptions is not no assumptions, but rather some 
other assumptions.  We need more clarity from researchers about the behav-
ioral restrictions and assumptions embedded in their mapping of empirical facts 
into normatively relevant ones, because the appropriateness of often untestable 
behavioral assumptions can be productively debated only when these assump-
tions are allowed out in the open. 
The second strand of this discussion is a bit more subtle, and is actually 
prior to the no blood from a stone principle.  One might call it the “understand 
which question you’re studying” principle.  There’s little point in arguing over 
whether an estimate is large or small, or larger or smaller than some other esti-
mate, if no one has a clear understanding of the estimand—i.e., the object of 
estimation.  It seems likely that most authors of empirical studies of 
Twombly/Iqbal have had in mind estimating something like what Hubbard has 
called the “true effect on dismissal rates.”95   
Using this phrase makes it seem like all researchers are trying to estimate 
some particular parameter’s value, and that any problems in so doing are the 
result of some sort of estimation challenge, whether due to party selection ef-
fects or other factors such as changes in the economy that change litigation be-
havior.  Yet that can’t be right, for at least two reasons.  First, there is surely 
variation across cases in the probability of dismissal: some complaints are 
stronger than others; some cases are assigned to judges who may be more de-
fendant- or plaintiff-friendly.  Moreover, as a practical matter some cases will 
never face Rule 12(b)(6) motions, since plaintiffs in those cases will have no 
problem pleading plausibly.  Since we never observe such cases facing Rule 
12(b)(6) motions, we have no way (other than via assumption) to learn any-
thing at all about “the true” dismissal rate for cases such as these.96  In the ap-
plied econometrics literature, much attention has been paid in recent decades to 
what has come to be known as treatment effect heterogeneity.  The issues can 
get very technical and notationally dense, but roughly speaking, the end result 
                                                
95. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, supra note 40, at 15. 
96. James Heckman has made the point that certain types of overall effects are neither 
policy relevant nor interesting to observe. See, e.g., James J. Heckman, Instrumental Vari-
ables: A Study of Implicit Behavioral Assumptions Used in Making Program Evaluations, 32 
J. HUM. RESOURCES 441, 443-44 (1997) (“Picking a millionaire at random to participate in a 
training program for low skilled workers, or making an idiot into a PhD may be intriguing 
thought experiments but are usually neither policy relevant nor feasible. They are not policy 
relevant because interest centers on the effects of programs on intended recipients-not on 
persons for whom the program was never intended. It is not a feasible random-assignment 
strategy because millionaires would never agree to participate in such a training program 
even if they were offered the chance to do so, and few idiots would be able to attain the PhD 
in most fields.”). 
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has been an agreement that what researchers typically are estimating in such 
circumstances—their estimand—is some sort of average effect among units 
that could be affected by the policy change at issue.97 
Thus it is important to understand that even if Hubbard’s “true effect on 
dismissal rates” could be identified empirically, it would be some sort of aver-
age of the true effect on the probability of dismissal for some subset of all dis-
putes.  In Hubbard’s context, that subset would be something like “the set of 
disputes that would turn into lawsuits if the parties expected one pleading stan-
dard to govern when the plaintiff filed suit but then found out some other stan-
dard would govern.”  At best, Hubbard’s approach identifies an average effect 
among such disputes, which might differ importantly from other disputes of in-
terest.  To be sure, the negatively affected share measure I discuss in Part III.C, 
infra, also concerns only a subset of cases (those that would have a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion filed under the post-Iqbal pleading standard).  Thus I do not 
mean to criticize Hubbard, or anyone else, for using a method that could iden-
tify policy impact for only some types of cases; without further assumptions 
that ensure homogeneity of policy effects, this is simply a fact of empirical life. 
Second, and at least as important, is the fact that “the probability of dis-
missal” is itself a problematic and incomplete object of study.  As I argued in 
Locking the Doors and shall discuss in Part III, infra, a change in the pleading 
standard can be expected to affect parties’ welfare through direct selection-
related channels, not just through the change in the probability that any given 
case would be dismissed.  Thus, it is a mistake to compare the results in Lock-
ing the Doors—which self-consciously considered a broader array of effects 
than simply changes in judicial behavior—directly to others in the literature.98  
This example shows that it is important not only to be clear about the behav-
ioral framework in which an estimate is to be interpreted, but also to be clear 
about what object is being estimated, and why that object is of interest. 
                                                
97. See, e.g., James Heckman & Richard Robb, Alternative Methods For Evaluating 
the Impact of Interventions, in LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF LABOR MARKET DATA 156-245 
(James Heckman & Burton Singer eds., 1985); Guido W. Imbens & Joshua D. Angrist, Iden-
tification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects, 62 ECONOMETRICA 467 
(1994).  For studies seeking to identify distributional effects, rather than simply mean im-
pacts, see, e.g., John DiNardo, Nicole M. Fortin, & Thomas Lemieux, Labor Market Institu-
tions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach, 64 
ECONOMETRICA 1001 (1996); James J. Heckman, Jeffrey Smith & Nancy Clements, Making 
the Most Out of Programme Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting for Heteroge-
neity in Programme Impacts, 64 REV. ECON. STUDIES 487 (1997); Marianne P. Bitler, Jonah 
B. Gelbach, & Hilary W. Hoynes, What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Wel-
fare Reform Experiments, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 988 (2006). 
98. For example, Hubbard commits this error when he writes that Locking the Doors 
“account[s] for selection effects in estimating the effects of Twombly or Iqbal on dismissal 
rates.”  Hubbard, Testing for Change, supra note 40, at 45. 
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III.  A CASE STUDY: THE LOCKING THE DOORS BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK AND 
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
In this Part I discuss the behavioral framework I built and explored in 
Locking the Doors, as well as its connection to the empirical results reported 
there.  A key building block in Locking the Doors is the idea that for any plead-
ing standard, each dispute has a potential outcome that would obtain in that dis-
pute if the pleading standard in question governed.99  It is critical to recognize 
that potential outcomes are counterfactual objects.  Regardless of what does 
happen, potential outcomes tell us something about what would happen if a 
state of the world were to occur. 
In discussing the behavioral framework in Locking the Doors, I assumed 
that each case involves a single plaintiff with a single claim against a single de-
fendant, that Rule 12(b)(6) motions are the only type of motion to dismiss, and 
that any time such a motion is granted, it is granted without allowing the plain-
tiff leave to amend her complaint.  For exposition’s sake, I shall at first retain 
these assumptions; in Part III.F.1, infra, I explain why their importance is only 
expositional—no qualitative differences arise when I relax these assumptions. 
A.  Potential Outcomes 
In Locking the Doors, I noted that we can separate cases into several cate-
gories of potential outcomes: 
• “D” disputes: those that are dropped without the plaintiff’s filing a 
complaint; 
• “S” disputes: those that involve an agreed settlement before the defen-
dant files either an answer or a motion to dismiss (these cases might be 
settled either before or after the plaintiff files her complaint); 
• “A” disputes: those in which the plaintiff files a complaint and the de-
fendant files an answer without filing a motion to dismiss; 
• “M” disputes: those in which the plaintiff files a complaint and the de-
fendant files a motion to dismiss. 
I then observed that since each dispute has a unique potential outcome un-
der a given pleading standard, we can further categorize disputes according to 
the sixteen logically possible pairs of these potential outcomes that might ob-
tain under the Conley and Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards.  The matrix in 
Figure 5 illustrates these sixteen possible dispute types, with potential out-
comes under Conley represented in the matrix’s rows and potential outcomes 
under Twombly/Iqbal represented in its columns. 
                                                
99. For an early discussion of the role of potential outcomes in defining and estimating 
causal effects, see Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized 
and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCOL. 688 (1974). 
Spring 2014] DARK ARTS AND EMPIRICAL REALITY 251 
 
 
Figure 5: A Taxonomy of Cases in Terms of Potential Outcomes Under the 
Conley and Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Regimes 
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Thus, for example, a dispute of type DD is one that would be dropped by 
the plaintiff under Conley (the first “D”) and also dropped under 
Twombly/Iqbal (the second “D”), while an AA dispute is one in which, under 
both pleading standards, the plaintiff would file suit and the defendant would 
file an answer; similarly, SS disputes are settled under both pleading standards 
and MM disputes involve a plaintiff’s filing suit and a defendant’s filing a mo-
tion to dismiss.  These four types of disputes—whose potential outcome is the 
same under the two pleading standards, and which are represented with shaded 
cells on the top-left to bottom-right diagonal part of the Figure 5 matrix—are 
what I term “non-selection” cases.  Disputes with different potential outcomes 
under the two pleading standards are those that involve some sort of selection, 
since parties do different things in these disputes as a function of the governing 
pleading standard.  These dispute types are represented by the cells that lie off 
the diagonal that runs from the top-left to the bottom-right of Figure 5’s matrix.  
I define settlement selection to include any dispute that would be settled under 
one pleading standard but not the other.  For example, in SM disputes, the par-
ties would settle under Conley, but under Twombly/Iqbal the plaintiff would file 
suit and the defendant would file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; thus SM disputes in-
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volve settlement selection.  All told, the dispute types that involve settlement 
selection are SD, SA, SM, DS, AS, and S.  Settlement selection dispute types 
are represented in Figure 5 using bold font in the cell labels. 
Dispute types that do not involve settlement selection but do involve a 
change in whether the defendant files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion are those that I 
term defendant selection disputes.  For example, AM disputes involve defen-
dant selection, because while the plaintiff would file suit under either standard, 
the defendant would file an answer under Conley but file a motion to dismiss 
under Twombly/Iqbal.  In Figure 5, defendant selection disputes are represented 
with underlined cell labels.  Finally, I say that disputes involve plaintiff selec-
tion if they do not involve settlement selection but do involve a change in 
whether the plaintiff files suit.  Thus plaintiff selection occurs in disputes of 
type AD, MD, DA, and DM.  Dispute types in which there is plaintiff selection 
are represented with italic font in the cell labels in Figure 5.100 
The next step in Locking the Doors was to divide “M” cases into two more 
refined potential outcome sub-categories:  
• “MD” cases: those M cases in which the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
would be denied; 
• “MG” cases: those M cases in which the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
would be granted. 
Now we have five, rather than four, potential outcomes for each pleading 
standard.  Since each dispute has one potential outcome under each pleading 
standard, there are 25 logically possible dispute types: each of the five types of 
potential outcome under Conley, paired with each of the five types under 
Twombly/Iqbal, as depicted in the expanded matrix in Figure 6. The matrix re-
tains Figure 5’s approach of using different shading and fonts to highlight 
which dispute types are which. 
                                                
100. Notice that dispute types DM and MD involve both plaintiff and defendant selec-
tion. 




Figure 6: Expanded Taxonomy of Cases in Terms of Potential Outcomes 
Under the Conley and Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Regimes 
  Outcome under Twombly/Iqbal Standard 
MTD Filed 
  Dropped Settled An-swer-ed Denied Grant-ed 
Dropped DD  DS  DA DMD DMG 
Settled SD SS  SA SMD SMG 
Answered AD AS AA AMD AMG 
















Shaded — Non-selection disputes 
Bold — Settlement selection disputes 
Underlined — Defendant selection disputes 
Italicized — Plaintiff selection disputes 
 One feature of Figure 6 is that it helps clarify which judicial behavior ef-
fects might possibly be identified empirically.  Formally, I define a given dis-
pute’s judicial behavior effect to be (i) the probability that a judge would grant 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that dispute under Twombly/Iqbal if the dispute were 
to reach the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of litigation under that pleading standard, mi-
nus (ii) the corresponding probability of a Rule 12(b)(6) grant under Conley, 
again if the dispute were to reach the Rule 12(b)(6) stage under that pleading 
standard. 
254 STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [Vol. 2:2 
 
Thus, the judicial behavior effect is defined for every dispute, even if the 
dispute would never actually have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion adjudicated.  For ex-
ample, consider a dispute over who won a round of Rochambeau,101 with stakes 
equal to $1, between a single plaintiff and a single defendant.  Assuming nei-
ther party cares about the principle involved, this dispute would obviously 
never lead to a federal lawsuit, much less a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.102  But the 
question of what would happen under each pleading standard, if such a dispute 
were litigated to the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, is logically prior to whether the event 
will happen.  So it is proper to speak of the judicial behavior effect for this dis-
pute—and, indeed, for any dispute.  That said, observe that the only dispute 
types in Figure 6 that would see Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed under both plead-
ing standards are, by definition, those involving disputes that are Type M under 
both pleading standard.  We can define the judicial behavior effect among these 
dispute types as  
  
This parameter tells us the share of MM cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion is granted only because of the switch to the Twombly/Iqbal pleading 
standard—that is, it tells us the share of MM cases in which Twombly/Iqbal 
but-for cause a Rule 12(b)(6) motion grant. Thus, JBEMM is the kind of parame-
ter that authors in the empirical literature seem to have in mind. In the next sec-
tion, I analyze the circumstances under which JBEMM can be identified empiri-
cally and conclude that these circumstances are unlikely. 
First, though, we should take note of another important point: even if 
JBEMM could be identified, this judicial behavior effect parameter would tell us 
the judicial behavior effect only among MM disputes.  It is entirely possible that 
the effect would be different among other dispute types.103  This is important to 
recognize because it is parties’ perceived changes in judicial behavior that will 
be the driving force in changing party behavior.  And many cases might involve 
party selection, placing them outside the MM set.  Thus, even if we could learn 
the judicial behavior effect among MM cases, we would be missing much of 
the landscape that is relevant to understanding how party behavior changes.  
This is an example in which it is important to keep in mind Fischman’s admo-
nition to “think more carefully about how empirical findings generalize from a 
research setting to a policy-relevant context.”104 
                                                
101. See, e.g., What’s the Origin of “Rock, Paper, Scissors?” THE STRAIGHT DOPE, 
available at http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/1936/whats-the-origin-of-rock-
paper-scissors. 
102. Civil procedure mavens might wonder at subject matter jurisdiction here.  Posit, 
then, the hypothetical federal question jurisdiction-conveying Federal Rock, Paper, Scissors 
Fairness Act. 
103. See supra discussion of treatment effect heterogeneity at notes 96-96. 
104. Fischman, supra note 5, at 154. 
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B.  Using an Economic Model as Behavioral Framework Eliminates the 
Possibility of Some Dispute Types, But Not Enough to Make Grant Rate 
Differences Informative 
The discussion in section A, supra, imposed no particular behavioral 
framework: it considered all logically possible dispute types in terms of their 
pair of potential outcomes under the two pleading standards.  Here I follow the 
approach in Locking the Doors: I sketch a simple economic model of pretrial 
litigation whose key foundations are the assumptions (i) that parties behave ra-
tionally, in the sense that each party pursues her self-interest as she understands 
it, and roughly speaking, and (ii) that litigation activity occurs if and only if at 
least one party expects to be better off litigating than either settling or allowing 
the case to move to the next stage.105 
One payoff from using this model is that we can eliminate from considera-
tion the possibility that there are disputes of certain of the types discussed 
above.  First, because there is no reason to think Twombly/Iqbal actually reduce 
defendants’ chances of winning on a motion to dismiss, we can rule out MGMD 
disputes; in such disputes a judge would grant the Rule 12(b)(6) motion under 
Conley but deny it under Twombly/Iqbal.  Second, we can rule out MDA and 
MGA disputes: a defendant who would find it worth filing a motion to dismiss 
when her adversary files suit under Conley will never find it worthwhile to 
back down and file an answer under Twombly/Iqbal.  We can rule out the pres-
ence of DS, DA, DMD, and DMG disputes for essentially the same reason: 
whatever the precise effect of Twombly and Iqbal, they hardly could improve 
plaintiffs’ assessment of the returns to litigating.  In Figure 7, I repeat the tax-
onomy from Figure 6, except that I indicate the dispute types whose presence is 
ruled out under the economic model by blacking out the cells that represent 
them.  
 
                                                
105. I work out the details of this model in considerable mathematical detail in Gel-
bach, Selection in Motion, supra note 17. 
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Figure 7: Expanded Taxonomy of Cases, with Model-Eliminated Dispute 
Types Indicated 
  Outcome under Twombly/Iqbal Standard  
MTD Filed 






    
Settled SD SS SA SMD SMG 
Answered AD AS AA AMD AMG 









MGD MGS   MGMG 
       
  
Legend 
Blacked out — Model implies no disputes of type 
Shaded — Non-selection disputes 
Bold — Settlement selection disputes 
Underlined — Defendant selection disputes 
Italicized — Plaintiff selection disputes 
 
It can be shown, however, that all dispute types whose cells in Figure 7 are 
not blacked out might occur even when parties are rational in the way discussed 
above.106  An important consequence is that the change in the Rule 12(b)(6) 
grant rate is broadly uninformative about any effect of interest. Observe the fol-
lowing: 
 
                                                
106. See Gelbach, Selection in Motion, supra note 17. 
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• The dispute types that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted under Conley 
are MGMG, MGS, and MGD.107 
• The dispute types that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed under Conley are 
those that have grants under Conley, as well as MDMG, MDMD, MDS, and 
MDD disputes.108 
• Thus, using the convention that the number of disputes of each type is rep-
resented by the dispute type’s label, the grant rate under Conley is:  
 
 
• The dispute types that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted under 
Twombly/Iqbal are MGMG, MDMG, AMG, and SMG.109 
• The dispute types that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed under 
Twombly/Iqbal are those that have grants under Twombly/Iqbal, as well as 
MDMD, AMD, and SMD disputes.110 
• Again using the convention that the number of disputes of each type is rep-




 Obviously all this is a bit of a mess.  And the difference between the grant 
rates gC and gTI is even worse; it certainly does not seem that anything simple 
can be learned by measuring the difference in the grant rate across pleading 
standards.  With a bunch of boring algebra, it can be shown that the difference 
in the grant rates equals: 
                                                
107. Thus the disputes that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted under Conley include 
non-selection disputes (MGMG), settlement selection disputes (MGS), and plaintiff selection 
disputes (MGD). 
108. Thus, in addition to the dispute types with Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted under 
Conley, the disputes that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed under Conley—whether the mo-
tion is granted or denied—include additional non-selection disputes (MDMG and MDMD), ad-
ditional settlement selection disputes (MDS), and additional plaintiff selection disputes 
(MDD). 
109. Thus, the disputes that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted under Twombly/Iqbal 
include non-selection disputes (MGMG and MDMG), defendant selection disputes (AMG), and 
settlement selection disputes (SMG). 
110. Thus, in addition to the dispute types with Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted under 
Twombly/Iqbal, the disputes that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed under Twombly/Iqbal—
whether the motion is granted or denied—include additional non-selection disputes (MDMD), 




g ≡ GM GM + GM S + GM DMM + MS + MD
€ 
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(1)   
where BTI, BC, and BΔ all depend on the numbers of disputes of various 
types.111  It can be shown that both BTI and BC are positive and no greater than 
1, and that either can be the greater of the two.  It can also be shown that BΔ 
can be either positive or negative. 
I shall now illustrate the pathologies that inhere in using the difference in 
grant rates to measure the judicial behavior effect parameter JBEMM.  First sup-
pose that Twombly and Iqbal have no impact on judicial behavior at all, so that 
JBEMM is zero.  In that case, the change in the grant rate equals the term in 
square brackets just above.  It is easy to construct examples in which this term 
is positive, negative, or zero.112  And even if the judicial behavior effect is posi-
tive—so that judges dismiss more MM cases under Twombly/Iqbal than they 
would under Conley—it is possible to construct examples in which the differ-
ence of the grant rate takes on any sign.113  Consequently, observed values of 
the change in the grant rate carry no information even about the sign of judicial 
behavior effects.  In other words: by itself, the change in the grant rate tells us 
nothing at all about the judicial behavior effect among MM cases.114  The 
                                                
111. The BTI, BC, and BΔ terms are given by the following: 
,  , 
 
and  
The BTI term tells us the share of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed under 
Twombly/Iqbal in which there is not party selection, and the BC term tells us the correspond-
ing fact for cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed under Conley.  The first part of the BΔ 
term measures the importance of party selection among cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
granted under Twombly/Iqbal, as a share of the number of cases with such motions filed un-
der Twombly/Iqbal; the second part of the BΔ term measures the analogous fact under Con-
ley.  Thus, BΔ is positive when selection is a proportionately more important factor in driv-
ing grants under Twombly/Iqbal than it is under Conley, with importance calculated 
proportionately to the number of motions filed under each respective pleading standard. 
112. Recall that (BC – BTI) may have any sign, as can BΔ; it is also possible to show 
that neither the sign of (BC – BTI) nor the sign of BΔ restricts the other.  By setting both (BC – 
BTI)>0 and BΔ>0, we get a positive square-bracket term (since the grant rate under Conley is 
always positive).  By reversing the inequalities, we get a negative square-bracket term, and 
by replacing them with “=” we get a zero square-bracket term. 
113. See Table 1 of Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17 at 2313 (providing an 
example of each type, with a true judicial behavior effect among MM cases of 20 percentage 
points). 
114. In fact, I go further than this in other draft work.  See Gelbach, Selection in Mo-
tion, supra note 17 (showing that both the presence and absence of judicial behavior effects 
is consistent with any combination of (i) change in the grant rate, (ii) change in the share of 
filed cases that face Rule 12(b)(6) motions, and (iii) number of cases filed). 
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change in the grant rate is just like our hypothetical statistician’s attempt to test 
the theory of demand by regressing quantity on price (see Part II.A, supra), 
where any empirical finding would have been consistent with the empirical cor-
rectness of the theory. 
A quick look at equation (1) shows that the difference in the grant rate does 
identify JBEMM when BTI=1, BC=1, and BΔ=0 all hold.  What are the conditions 
under which these three conditions all are satisfied?  Precisely the conditions 
under which there is no party selection.  This can be seen by inspecting note 
111, supra, and observing that 
o BTI=1 if and only if there are no AM or SM cases (so that there 
is no selection into Rule 12(b)(6) motion filing); 
o BC=1 if and only if there are no MS or MD cases (so that there is 
no selection out of Rule 12(b)(6) motion filing); 
o BΔ=0 if each of the first two conditions holds.115 
Thus, just as our statistician from Part II can claim her regression results 
estimate the demand curve if she is willing to assume away variation in de-
mand, so, too, can a civil procedure researcher claim to identify the judicial be-
havior effect among MM cases if she is willing to assert the absence of defen-
dant selection (which eliminates AM disputes), plaintiff selection (which 
eliminates MD disputes), and settlement selection (which eliminates SM and 
MS disputes); notice that when there are no party selection effects of these 
types, there is no party selection at all. 
I have made no bones about my view that it is entirely unreasonable to 
make this assumption.  In part, that is because the empirical evidence decisively 
rejects the assumption that there is no party selection.  For example, the FJC 
authors’ initial report shows that the rate at which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are 
filed rose substantially among filed cases.116  All else equal, such a result can be 
observed only if there are some disputes whose pair of potential outcomes has 
an “M” at the end but not at the front.  In other words, it can be observed only 
if there is either defendant selection—AM cases—or settlement selection—SM 
cases.117 
This discussion shows that the assumption of no selection is rejected by the 
data.  But that assumption was only a sufficient condition for the difference in 
the grant rate to identify the judicial behavior effect among MM cases.  It is 
natural to wonder whether there are other assumptions that would yield identi-
fication of the judicial behavior effect parameter JBEMM.  Formally, the answer 
is yes, but for practical purposes it is no, because the required assumptions both 
                                                
115. Notice that BΔ can equal 0 even when BTI and BC are not both 1.  However, I do 
not pursue this point since BTI=1 and BC=1 both require the absence of selection. 
116. See FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 9 tbl.1. 
117. Under the restrictions of the economic model, there will be no DM cases. 
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are very strong and appear impossible to motivate in an intuitive way.118  Con-
sequently, it appears that researchers looking to estimate judicial behavior ef-
fects among MM cases are out of luck: the assumptions necessary to do so are 
too strong to accept. 
This admonition applies to all empirical studies that have concentrated on 
using Twombly and Iqbal’s effects on Rule 12(b)(6) outcomes to measure judi-
cial behavior effects.119  That includes Hubbard’s work, even though, as dis-
cussed supra, it plausibly eliminates plaintiff selection effects.120  In the 
framework discussed here, eliminating plaintiff selection effects means elimi-
nating MDD and MGD cases.  But this restriction has no effect on our BTI term, 
and while it does limit the types of cases that might be represented in our BC 
and BΔ terms, it does not do so in a way that provides any more useful informa-
tion about the relative magnitude of these terms.121 
                                                
118. After a lot of tedious algebra, it can be shown that when BTI and BC are not both 
1, the difference in the grant rate equals the judicial behavior effect among MM cases if and 
only if 
 
The most important thing to note is that this high-level condition places a restriction on 
JBEMM, the object of measurement itself: only when the judicial behavior effect happens to 
equal a complicated function of various selection-related effects will the grant rate identify 
JBEMM.  It might seem that some headway could be made via the assumption that , which 
implies that the same number of cases select out of, and into, the state of having Rule 
12(b)(6) motions as a result of Twombly and Iqbal.  Under this restriction, the first term in 
square brackets would be zero.  Even then, though, the difference in the grant rate identifies 
JBEMM only if JBEMM itself just happens to equal BΔ/(1-BTI), and it can be shown that this 
implies the restriction that JBEMM equals the ratio [(AMG+SMG)-(MGS+MGD)]÷(AM+SM), 
which isn’t even possible when the numerator term is negative; more generally, there is just 
no reason to believe it should be true. 
119. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011) 
is an exception, but only because he considers only cases from the pre-Twombly period, and 
in this sense his is a completely different approach. 
120. Here I focus on Tables 4 and 5 of Hubbard, Testing for Procedural Change, su-
pra note 40, at 54 and 55, respectively (these tables report results from linear regressions, 
which can be viewed functionally as estimated changes in the grant rate after partialing out 
variation due to covariates included in Hubbard’s models).  Tables 6 and 7 of his paper, at 56 
and 57, respectively, use a different denominator—all filed cases, rather than all cases in 
which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was filed.  The resulting outcome variable, which equals the 
ratio of the number of measured Rule 12(b)(6) grants divided by the number of all cases 
filed, can be written as the product of (i) the conventional grant rate discussed here and (ii) 
the Rule 12(b)(6) filing rate among all filed cases.  As discussed in supra note 114, I show in 
Jonah B. Gelbach, Selection in Motion, supra note 17, that both the presence and absence of 
judicial behavior effects is consistent with any combination of (i) change in the grant rate 
and (ii) change in the share of filed cases that face Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  This means that, 
like his Table 4 and 5 results, Hubbard’s Table 6 and 7 results are consistent with both the 
presence and the absence of changes in judicial behavior as a result of Twombly and Iqbal. 
121. For example, if there is enough settlement selection in the form of MS cases, BC 
might exceed BTI even with no plaintiff selection; if there is enough defendant selection or 
€ 
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Thus, Hubbard’s results for the change in the grant rate are consistent with 
either the presence or absence of judicial behavior effects among MM cases 
(i.e., non-selection cases that face Rule 12(b)(6) motions).  In terms of its claim 
to identification, then, Hubbard’s approach has no more payoff than any of the 
other grant rate-comparing approaches in the literature.  This conclusion shows 
just how important it is to embed one’s analysis in a clear behavioral frame-
work.  Hubbard does provide a high-level discussion of litigation selection 
models, but he fails to make that discussion sufficiently operational to recog-
nize that controlling for plaintiff selection alone is insufficient to identify any 
effect of interest.  As with the rest of the empirical Twombly/Iqbal literature, 
Hubbard’s estimates identify a meaningful parameter only under the implausi-
ble assumption that there is neither defendant selection nor settlement selection. 
C. Mapping Potential Outcomes into a Measure of Negatively Affected Cases 
The foregoing discussion shows that judicial behavior effects cannot be 
identified without assumptions that no one should be willing to make.  In Lock-
ing the Doors I showed how, even so, we can learn something of real empirical 
interest without making such assumptions.  I reprise that demonstration in this 
section. 
 As discussed in Part III.B, the total number of cases that would have a mo-
tion to dismiss granted under Twombly/Iqbal equals the sum of the numbers of 
MGMG, MDMG, AMG, and SMG disputes.  Of these four types of disputes, the 
last three involve plaintiffs that are negatively affected by a change from Con-
ley to Twombly/Iqbal, as I define the concept of “negatively affected” in Lock-
ing the Doors: the plaintiff doesn’t get to discovery under Twombly/Iqbal, 
while she would either get to discovery or receive a settlement under Conley.  
The set of negatively affected cases on which I focus attention equals the total 
number of MDMG, AMG, and SMG disputes.122  If we could observe this num-
                                                                                                             
settlement selection in the form of SM cases, the opposite will occur; see supra note 111.  
Similar points can be made about the sign of the BΔ term. 
122. I emphasize that these are not the only disputes with negatively affected plaintiffs, 
given my definition of “negatively affected.”  For example, plaintiffs in AMD and SMD dis-
putes have to litigate Rule 12(b)(6) motions under Twombly/Iqbal that they would not face 
under Conley.  See also Cecil, Waves, supra, at 13 (stating that “a plaintiff also may be 
‘negatively affected’ by having to respond to a motion to dismiss, even if the motion is de-
nied”). 
 Observe that the number of AMD and SMD disputes equals the number of disputes with 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions denied post-Twombly/Iqbal minus the number of MDMD disputes.  
Meanwhile, the number of disputes with a Rule 12(b)(6) motions denied under Conley is at 
least as great as the number of MDMD disputes.  It follows that the number of AMD and SMD 
disputes is at least as great as the change in the number of Rule 12(b)(6) denials.  Table 1 of 
the FJC INITIAL REPORT, see supra note 40, at 9, reports that Rule 12(b)(6) motions were 
filed in 6.9% of 3,795, or 262, pre-Twombly employment discrimination cases and in 9.0% 
of 3,871, or 348, post-Iqbal cases.  These statistics together imply an increase of 86 Rule 
12(b)(6) filings in employment discrimination cases.  Table A-1 of the FJC UPDATED 
REPORT, see supra note 33, at 7, indicates that respondents prevailed in roughly 39% of the 
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ber, we could determine the fraction of negatively affected cases among all 
those that face a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Twombly/Iqbal.  The denominator 
of this negatively affected share is observable, because the total number of 
cases that would have Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed if Twombly/Iqbal were the 
operative pleading standard is necessarily the total number of cases that do 
have Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed under Twombly/Iqbal when that pleading 




 We can observe the number of cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 
granted under Twombly/Iqbal, but this number includes both cases in which 
plaintiffs are negatively affected—the MDMG, AMG, and SMG cases discussed 
above—and cases in which plaintiffs are unaffected.  The latter category is 
composed of MGMG disputes—those that would have a motion to dismiss filed 
and granted under either pleading standard.  Because it is impossible to observe 
the same case adjudicated at the same time by the same court under different 
pleading standards, we can never directly observe more than one potential out-
come of any case.123  Unfortunately, cases do not come with convenient labels 
indicating what would have happened had they faced a different set of legal 
rules.  Thus we have no way to tell which cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
granted under Twombly/Iqbal also would have had such motions granted under 
Conley—which cases, in other words, are MGMG cases.  In terms of Figure 8, 
we would like to know the number of disputes that occupy the middle three 
cells of the final column—those that involve Rule 12(b)(6) grants that occur 
under Twombly/Iqbal but would not occur under Conley—but all we can ob-
serve directly is the number of disputes that occupy all four cells of this col-
umn, including the MGMG cell. 
                                                                                                             
Rule 12(b)(6) motions that the FJC coded in both the pre-Twombly and the post-Iqbal peri-
ods.  Using a denial rate of 39% in each of the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods implies 
that the number of AMD and SMD disputes must have increased by at least 34.  This figure 
implies that Twombly and Iqbal caused what might be called negative litigation effects on 
plaintiffs—forcing them to litigate motions they would win but would not face under Con-
ley—in at least 13% (34 out of 262) of employment discrimination cases in which a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion was filed in the post-Iqbal period.  Thus, negative litigation effects might 
well have been nontrivial. 
123. The problem that causal effects are defined in terms of multiple potential out-
comes, whereas at most one potential outcome can be observed for any unit of interest, is 
sometimes called the fundamental evaluation problem; see Gelbach, Locking the Doors, su-
pra note 17, at 2296. It is an unavoidable fact that this problem can be solved only via as-
sumptions. 
€ 
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Figure 8: Taxonomy of Cases with Rule 12(b)(6) Motions Granted Under 
at Least One Pleading Standard 
    
  Outcome under Twombly/Iqbal Standard  
MTD Filed 
  Dropped Settled Answered 
Denied Granted 
Dropped      
Settled     SMG 
Answered     AMG 









MGD MGS   MGMG 
       
  
Legend 
Blacked out — Model implies no disputes of type 
Shaded — Non-selection disputes 
Bold — Settlement selection disputes 
Underlined — Defendant selection disputes 
Italicized — Plaintiff selection disputes 
Empty — No Rule 12(b)(6) grant under either 
pleading standard  
 
 Here is where the lower bound part comes into play.  Even though there is 
no way to count the exact number of MGMG cases, there is a way to identify a 
number that must equal at least the number of MGMG cases.  This is true be-
cause the number of cases that would have Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted un-
der the Conley pleading standard necessarily equals the total number of cases of 
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types MGMG, MGD, and MGS,124 and there can never be negative numbers of 
MGD or MGS cases.  The total number of cases that would have Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions granted if Conley governed must exceed the total number of MGMG 
cases.  And the total number of cases that would have Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
granted under Conley if Conley governed is observable, because it is the num-
ber of cases that actually have motions granted when Conley governed.  In 
terms of Figure 8, the number of disputes with Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted 
under Conley is the number of disputes occupying any of the cells in the bottom 
row.  This number includes the number of disputes in the MGMG cell, as well as 
any disputes in the MGD and MGS cells.  Thus, the number of cases observed 
with Rule 12(b)(6) grants under Conley must equal at least the number of dis-
putes in the MGMG cell. 
Consequently, subtracting the number of cases with motions granted under 
Conley from the number with motions granted under Twombly/Iqbal identifies 
a floor beneath—known as a lower bound on—the number of cases in which 
plaintiffs are negatively affected, among those that face Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  
That is, the actual number of negatively affected cases must always be at least 
as great as this lower bound.  Since the number of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions filed under Twombly/Iqbal is observable, this means that observable data 
can be used to determine a lower bound on the negatively affected share.125  To 
do so, one need only take the increase in the number of cases with a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion granted126 and divide it by the number of cases in which a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion is filed:127 
 




                                                
124. Recall from section B, supra, that the existence of MA suits can be ruled out; this 
conclusion eliminates the possibility of observing any MGA disputes.  The same is true of 
MDMG cases. 
125. One exception to this statement relates to the nature of the FJC authors’ coding in 
the updated report.  See Part IV.D, infra, on Type Z disputes. 
126. See section D, infra, for a discussion of the empirical counterpart to “granted” 
motions as I have used that term in the present discussion. 
127. A point I did not discuss in Locking the Doors is that there is also an identifiable 
upper bound.  Since there can never be a negative number of MGMG disputes, the total num-
ber of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) grants under Twombly/Iqbal is an upper bound on the num-
ber of negatively affected cases defined above.  When we divide the former number by the 
number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed under Twombly/Iqbal, the result is the observed grant 
rate under Twombly/Iqbal.  Thus, the observed post-Iqbal grant rate is itself an upper bound 
on the share of cases with negatively affected plaintiffs, as I have defined that term. Meas-
ures of the grant rate are relatively high—typically in the 60% range—so this upper bound is 
not very informative.  Thus the identifiability of this upper bound appears to have primarily 
academic significance in the Twombly/Iqbal context. 
Anuja Thatte   6/2/14 2:39 PM
Comment: Jules can you view this whole image? 
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At this point it is useful to pause to connect this discussion back to the role 
of behavioral assumptions.  The behavioral framework introduced in section A, 
supra, was strong enough to allow us to rule out several dispute types.  But 
even if disputes of these types were not eliminated—i.e., even if I did not im-
pose an economic model that implies there will be no disputes of these types—
the lower bound in formula (2) would still be valid.128  Ironically, then, Cecil 
has it exactly backward when he suggests that my empirical conclusions are 
“closely tethered” to important behavioral assumptions.129  In fact, the primary 
function of the behavioral framework here is to show the analytical shortcom-
ings of other studies: as discussed above, unreasonably strong assumptions, 
such as the absence of party selection, would be necessary to justify use 
changes in the grant rate to measure even the judicial behavior effect among 
MM cases.  By contrast, the power of my lower bound approach is its weak as-
sumptions: it is empirically informative without making any assumptions at all 
on the pattern of party selection effects.130 
                                                
128. The seven eliminated dispute types are DS, DA, MGMD, MDA, MGA, DMD, and 
DMG.  The first two types do not involve a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under either pleading stan-
dard, so allowing them would not affect any of my analysis.  Of these, only the DMG dis-
putes would be included in the observed number of post-Iqbal grants.  Plaintiffs in such 
cases would be negatively affected by Twombly and Iqbal, since they would spend resources 
litigating under Twombly/Iqbal, only to lose at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, whereas they would 
avoid all litigation costs under Conley.  The MDA and DMD dispute types do not involve a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion being granted under either pleading standard.  Consequently, the pres-
ence of these disputes would not affect the numerator of formula (2).  If my economic model 
were wrong in ruling out the presence of such case types, then, the only effect would be to 
enlarge the number of dispute types over which both the negatively affected share and my 
lower bound on it are defined: my empirical estimates would apply to a broadened set of 
cases, but the estimates would be correct for that set. 
 Finally, MGMD and MGA disputes would be included in the number of cases with Rule 
12(b)(6) motions granted under Conley.  Thus if there were any of these dispute types, they 
would function only to reduce my lower bounds even further below the actual negatively 
affected share (to put it differently, one would need to add the number of MGMD and MGA 
disputes to the numerator in formula (2) just to get to the lower bound formula provided in 
that formula). 
129. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 38-39 (“I am in awe of Professor Gelbach’s skill 
in extending a common theoretical economic model to the pretrial litigation setting.  Not be-
ing a practitioner of such dark arts, I will leave it to others to critique the economic model 
itself.  But, I do know enough to recognize that such models are closely tethered to the as-
sumptions that underlie their development, and I have a number of concerns about the as-
sumptions on which Professor Gelbach erects his model.  I am particularly concerned about 
the manner in which Professor Gelbach incorporates the findings of our studies into his eco-
nomic model and the validity of his conclusion regarding the extent to which Twombly and 
Iqbal have restricted access to discovery and the opportunity to pursue their claims in 
court.”) (footnote omitted). 
130. It appears that part of Cecil’s problem here is due to his mistaken belief that the 
model I use in Locking the Doors is an adaptation of Priest and Klein’s famous model.  I ad-
dress this issue further in section III.F.1, infra. 
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D.  Empirical Implementation 
As explained in Part IV.B, infra, the FJC authors collected their data on 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion filing and motion outcomes in different ways. Conse-
quently, using formula (2) directly would require imputation of either the nu-
merator or the denominator of formula (2).  In Locking the Doors, I took the 
alternative approach of using a re-written version of formula (2).  Simple if te-
dious algebra can be used to show that the following formula is mathematically 
equivalent to formula (2): 
 
(3) Lower Bound in formula (2) =  
 
Change in grant rate + (Pre-Twombly grant rate) x m, 
 
 
where    m =  
 
This is a useful version of the lower bound formula for two reasons.  First 
it allows me to use separate data source on grants and filings—an issue to 
which I shall return.  Second, it allows one to see how the lower bound relates 
to the change in the grant rate.  The lower bound formula equals that change, 
plus an additional term involving (i) the pre-Twombly grant rate and (ii) the 
relative numerosity of Rule 12(b)(6) motions before and after Twombly/Iqbal.  
Thus, whenever the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed is greater after 
Twombly/Iqbal than before, the term m will be positive, so that the lower bound 
must exceed the simple change in the Rule 12(b)(6) grant rate.  Notice that if 
there were no party selection effects, then (all else equal) there would be no 
change in the number of motions filed, and the second term in formula (3) 
would equal zero.  In other words, in the absence of party selection, my lower 
bound formula simplifies to the simple change in the grant rate.131 
                                                
131. Indeed, it is easy to see that in the absence of party selection effects, the nega-
tively affected share NAS from formula (1)—and not just a lower bound on it—would equal 
the simple change in the grant rate.  With no party selection, the only cases that would exist 
would be DD, SS, AA, and MM cases.  Since there would be no difference in the number of 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed under the two pleading standards, the numerator of m in formula 
(3) would be zero, making the correction term zero.  Note also that the pre-Twombly number 
of cases with granted Rule 12(b)(6) motions would equal the number of MGMG cases, while 
the post-Iqbal number would equal the number of MGMG cases since there would be no 
MGMD cases (see text following note 105, supra) plus the number of MDMG cases.  Since the 
number of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed would be the same, the difference in the 
grant rates would equal the number of MDMG cases divided by the number of MM cases and 
this is precisely the negatively affected share in the absence of party selection effects. 
Finally, note that as an empirical matter, the converse of the claim in the text is not true. 
That is, finding empirical evidence that the lower bound and the change in the grant rate are 
equal does not generally imply the absence of selection.  This is true because equality be-
€ 
Increase in number of motions filed
Number of motions filed after Twombly/Iqbal
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As I discuss in section E, infra, though, the initial FJC report shows that 
the umber of Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed rose substantially between 2006 and 
2010.  Consequently, my lower bounds on the negatively affected share will 
necessarily exceed the simple change in the grant rate that.  Thus, the second 
term in formula (3) is a useful measure of the empirical importance of party se-
lection effects. 
This fact reflects an important part of my argument: when party behavior 
changes, there are additional routes to negative effects on cases besides the 
changes in judicial behavior that are incorporated in MDMG cases.  We should 
want to measure these effects.  It is critical to recognize, then, that I am not ar-
guing that the lower bound expressed in either formula (2) or formula (3) is a 
better measure, or a selection-corrected measure, of Hubbard’s “true effect on 
dismissal rates,”132 or some judicial behavior effect more generally.  Rather, I 
am offering a different answer to the which-question-are-you-studying query133 
from the one other authors in the literature have posed.  Whereas other authors 
have sought to estimate only changes in judicial behavior, my approach is di-
rected at learning something about both the effects of judicial behavior changes 
and effects due to changes in party behavior, because both types of effects im-
pact parties.  Thus, the approach set forth in Locking the Doors, and expanded 
on here, is sensitive to Fischman’s call for empirical researchers to increase the 
relevance of their research: this approach “allow[s] substantive questions to 
drive the[] choice of methods,” and it is “more explicit about how [it] com-
bin[es] objective findings with contestable assumptions in order to reach nor-
mative conclusions.”134 
E.  Empirical Evidence: Estimates of Alternative Lower Bounds 
In Table 1, I provide the data necessary to calculate the selection-related 
term for the three categories of cases I consider in Locking the Doors, which 
are civil rights; employment discrimination; and most other cases, to which I 
shall here refer as contract, tort and “other” cases.135  The first and second col-
                                                                                                             
tween the lower bound and the change in the grant rate is also consistent with the situation in 
which the effects of selection into and out of motion filing are in equipoise.  
132. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, supra note 40, at 15. 
133. See text accompanying supra note 95-96. 
134. Fischman, supra note 5, at 154. 
135. All data provided in this table were provided in Table 5 of Locking the Doors, at 
2333, which draws data from Table 1 of the initial report, supra note 33, at 9, and Table A-1 
of the updated report, supra note 33, at 7, as well as from supplemental tables generously 
provided to me by Joe Cecil.  The civil rights category excludes ADA cases due to statutory 
changes in ADA law that took effect in 2008; see id., at 2288, n. 69, for details.  Financial 
instruments cases are excluded due to concerns about the role of the financial crisis in chang-
ing the composition of these cases in unmeasurable ways; see id., at 2327.  The contract, tort, 
and “other” cases includes all case categories analyzed by the FJC reports except ADA 
cases, employment discrimination cases, financial instruments cases, and those in my civil 
rights category. 
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umns present the increase in Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed between 2006-2010 
and the number of such motions filed in 2010.  The third column reports the ra-
tio of the first column to the second, which yields m from formula (3).  This ra-
tio is substantial for all three case types, varying from 0.17 to 0.37. 
 
Table 1: Calculating the Selection-Related Term in Formula (3) 
     
Rule 12(b)(6) 
















Civil rights 78 454 0.17 60.3     10.3 
Employment 
discrimination 87 349 0.25 60.9      15.2 
Contracts, tort 
and other 727 1968 0.37 55.2      20.4 
Source: Table 5 of Locking the Doors, at 2333. 
a Product of third and fourth columns. 
The fourth column of Table 1 reports the measure of the pre-Twombly 
grant rate that I used in Locking the Doors, which is the percentage of movants 
ultimately prevailing as to one or more claims in cases with adjudicated mo-
tions that were included in the updated report’s pre-Twombly (2006) period.136  
The product of the third and fourth columns is the selection-related term, which 
I report in the final column of Table 1. 
The selection-related term ranges from a low of 10.3 percentage points, for 
civil rights cases, to a high of 20.4 points, for contract, tort and “other” cases.  
These are substantial values, indicating that party selection effects are empiri-
cally important. 
The remaining part of formula (3) involves only the change, between the 
pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods, in an appropriate measure of the Rule 
12(b)(6) grant rate.  The first two columns of Table 2 provide the pre-Twombly 
and post-Iqbal percentages of movants prevailing, while the third column pro-
vides the change.  The fourth column repeats the selection-related terms calcu-
lated in Table 1, and the fifth column provides my lower bound. 
                                                
136. The FJC Updated Report’s authors coded a movant as having prevailed in a case 
if “the court granted the last motion to dismiss in whole or in part and no opportunity to 
amend the complaint remained.”  FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 3.  For each of 
several case types, and in each of the pre- and post-Twombly/Iqbal periods for which the FJC 
collected data, I calculated the share of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions in which the 
movant prevailed according to this definition.  The relevant data come from Table A-1 of the 
updated report, supra note 33, at 7 tbl.1, together with some supplemental data generously 
provided by Joe Cecil; the raw data used in Locking the Doors appear in Appendix A, Table 
4 of that paper, at 2347. 
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Table 2: The Change in the Percentage of Movants Prevailing and the 
Lower bound on My Negatively Affected Share 
 Percentage of Movants Prevailing 






Civil rights 60.3 68.1 7.8 10.3 18.1 
Employment 
discrimination 60.9 61.1 0.2 15.2 15.4 
Contracts, tort 
and other 55.2 56.3 1.1 20.4 21.5 
 a Source: Table 4 of Locking the Doors, at 2331. 
b Source: Table 1, supra. 
c Sum of third and fourth columns. 
Table 2 indicates that Twombly and Iqbal negatively affected a substantial 
share of post-Iqbal cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was filed.  This con-
clusion holds for both civil rights and employment discrimination cases, for 
which the lower bounds are 18.1% and 15.4%, as well as the category of con-
tract, tort and other cases, for which the lower bound is 21.5%.  Importantly, 
less than half of the lower bounds’ magnitude comes, as an algebraic matter, 
from the change in the grant rate; for both employment discrimination cases 
and contract, tort, and “other” cases, virtually all of the lower bound is due to 
accounting for selection effects via the selection-related term in formula (3).  
These findings indicate that the accounting for selection is a very important part 
of understanding Twombly and Iqbal’s effects. 
F.  Robustness of the Empirical Lower Bound Results 
In this section, I address some criticisms that have been offered by Joe Ce-
cil of the FJC and Professor David Engstrom in separate papers.137  Section 1 
explains and responds to a grab-bag of reasons that Cecil has offered as reasons 
to reject the link between my behavioral framework and the data I use.  Some 
of Cecil’s criticisms are prosaic, while others go to the very core of the idea of 
using a clearly stated behavioral framework to guide empirical study of civil 
litigation.  As I explain below, none of Cecil’s criticisms is compelling.  
Section 2 addresses Engstrom’s view (shared by Cecil) that my approach in 
Locking the Doors was overinclusive and should have considered only those 
cases in which plaintiffs lose on all—rather than one or more—of their claims 
as a consequence of Twombly and Iqbal.  But Engstrom’s alternative lower 
                                                
137. See Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, and Engstrom, Twiqbal Puzzle, supra note 13. 
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bound estimates, which are noticeably lower than those in Locking the Doors, 
suffer from what I call a “wrong denominator” problem that renders them non-
comparable to the estimates in Locking the Doors.  I show how to construct two 
further alternative measures—one that follows Engstrom’s suggestion that only 
entirely dismissed plaintiffs should be considered negatively affected, and one 
that follows the approach in Locking the Doors—that do not suffer from the 
wrong denominator problem and do allow a direct comparison.  The alternative 
Engstrom-type measures are substantial in magnitude and, for two of the three 
case-type categories considered, they are statistically significant and exceed the 
alternative Locking the Doors-type estimates.  These findings suggest the gen-
eral robustness of the substance of my results to alternative units of analysis.  
1.  Setting fire to straw men: Priest & Klein and the 50-percent hypothesis 
Cecil kicks off his discussion by stating that I adapt the model in George 
Priest and Benjamin Klein’s famous paper on selection in litigation.138  The 
model I sketch in Locking the Doors and the one that Priest and Klein build do 
share an important methodological similarity, in that they are both examples of 
what are sometimes called divergent expectations (“DE”) models.139  The key 
aspect of such models is that settlement is assumed to happen whenever there is 
positive surplus from settlement, which means whenever the parties’ subjective 
beliefs make it possible for a settlement to leave each party better off than she 
expects to be in the event of litigation.  “Beliefs” here involve the parties’ sub-
jective expectations concerning the probability the plaintiff would prevail if 
litigation occurred; the value of any relief the plaintiff would realize if she pre-
vailed;140 and the various costs—both pecuniary and psychic—involved in liti-
gating and negotiating a settlement. 
But Cecil is wrong when he states that my model “is derived” from Priest 
and Klein’s.141  In fact, I do not “adapt”142 the Priest & Klein model.  Priest and 
Klein impose considerable mathematical structure on the distribution of parties’ 
                                                
138. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 38, n. 137 (citing George L. Priest and Benjamin 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)). 
139. As noted in, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993), formulation of divergent expectations 
models can be traced to work of William Landes, Richard Posner, and John Gould published 
in the early 1970s.  See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & 
ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judi-
cial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal 
Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1971).  Other terms are also sometimes used; see, e.g., 
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Law and Economics of Settlement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS, Jennifer Arlen, ed. (2014) (referring to such models as ones in-
volving “mutual optimism”). 
140. Such relief could be either monetary or injunctive; what matters isn’t the form of 
relief but rather that the parties are capable of developing subjective beliefs concerning its 
cost (defendant) and value (plaintiff). 
141. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 44.  
142. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 38. 
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mutual beliefs concerning the plaintiff’s likelihood of winning and the actual 
likelihood.  By contrast, I require only that the parties pursue their own inter-
ests as they understand them and that these beliefs are logically possible.143  
These are more than academic points.  Cecil attempts to tar Locking the Doors 
with the brush others have used to criticize Priest & Klein’s work, but the cri-
tiques he endorses are based alternatively (i) on assumptions that Priest & Klein 
make, but that I do not, or (ii) on predictions that Priest & Klein make concern-
ing litigation selection, but that I do not. 
Cecil first cites to Theodore Eisenberg for the proposition that Priest & 
Klein’s “model does not describe civil litigation when the issue in dispute is the 
extent of damages, or when an institutional litigant is worried about the effect 
of the outcome of the case on other litigation.”144  But a quick look at the part 
of Eisenberg’s paper to which Cecil cites shows that Eisenberg there is discuss-
ing not the presence of a selection effect generally, but rather the “clearly dis-
tinguishable . . . so-called 50 percent hypothesis.”145  As Eisenberg writes, this 
hypothesis “posits that the set of tried cases culled from the mass of underlying 
disputes will result in 50 percent victories for the plaintiff.”146  Eisenberg is 
quite clear in stating that it is the 50 percent hypothesis in particular, rather than 
anything general about litigation selection models, that fails to hold when the 
extent of damages is disputed or when an institutional litigant worries about ef-
fects on other litigation.  This is an important point because Locking the Doors 
never claims or implies that the 50 percent hypothesis should hold.147 
Cecil’s second appeal in his criticism of Priest & Klein is to Steven Shav-
ell’s well-known demonstration that, as his article is titled, Any Frequency of 
                                                
143. A detailed discussion of Priest & Klein’s assumptions would require delving into 
unnecessarily technical detail.  But it is sufficient to note that their assumptions concerning 
parties’ beliefs imply that the parties’ beliefs about case quality are highly positively corre-
lated not only with each other, but also with true case quality.  As I discuss in other work in 
progress, there is nothing about the DE framework that requires such assumptions. Jonah B. 
Gelbach, Is Everything You Know About Litigation Selection and the Plaintiff’s Win Rate 
Wrong? (January 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
144. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 38, n. 141 (citing Theodore Eisenberg, Testing 
the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
337, 338-39 (1990)). 
145. Eisenberg, supra note 144, at 338.  
146. Id. 
147. Unlike Cecil, Eisenberg himself is careful to distinguish bases for rejecting the 50 
percent hypothesis and the general relevance of selection in litigation. See, e.g., id. at 340 
(“The 50 percent hypothesis may be rejected while the basic selection effect is retained.”). It 
is also worth noting that Priest and Klein themselves viewed the 50 percent hypothesis only 
as a limiting case, see George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 (1984)) (“Although the model has demonstrated a ten-
dency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories in litigation which is independent of the shape of 
the underlying distribution of disputes, the 50 percent success rate will actually be achieved 
only near the limit.”), and also that they themselves discuss a variety of conditions under 
which the 50 percent hypothesis will not hold—including, for example, when damages are 
disputed, see id. 
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Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible.148  But like the appeal to Eisenberg, this 
one has bite only with respect to the 50 percent hypothesis.149  Since the model 
in Locking the Doors does not rely on or endorse this hypothesis, Shavell’s re-
sults are no more problematic for my model than Eisenberg’s observations.  In 
fact, as I elaborate in related work in progress, the model undergirding Locking 
the Doors is consistent with a plaintiff’s win rate anywhere between 0 and 
100% — just as Shavell demonstrates in his own model.150 
Cecil next flags Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud’s “finding that data on 
outcomes of trials depart from the prediction of the Priest‐Klein model.”151  
Gross and Syverud’s report both that “the fifty percent hypothesis . . . thor-
oughly fail[s] to describe [the litigation] outcomes” that Gross and Syverud 
study,152 and that “our data, both for the entire set of trials and for the dominant 
subset of personal injury trials, are even more inconsistent with Priest and 
Klein’s general model as applied to cases with disputed damages than with the 
simple fifty percent hypothesis.”153  But neither finding is problematic for my 
approach, which does not impose the structural assumptions that yield the 
Priest & Klein predictions at issue.  Cecil’s final basis for questioning my 
model is to cite to a paper “reviewing empirical support for and against the 
Priest‐Klein model.”154  Once again for good measure: empirical support for 
and against the Priest‐Klein model is beside the point. 
In sum, whatever the merits of the criticisms Cecil marshals against Priest 
& Klein’s work on its own terms, these criticisms are non sequiturs as applied 
to the model I used in Locking the Doors and reprise in the present Article.  I 
do not place the mathematical structure either on party beliefs, or on the distri-
                                                
148. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 38, n. 141 (citing Steven Shavell, Any Frequency 
of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996)). 
149.  Shavell, supra note 148, at 495 (“Although there are no errors of logic in the 
Priest Klein model and it is to be praised for its general and original conclusion that cases 
that go to trial are unrepresentative of settled cases the assumptions of the model that lead to 
the 50 percent tendency [for success at trial] appear to be special, and they implicitly rule out 
a general range of plausible situations.”). 
150. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Selection in Motion: A Formal Model of Rule 12(b)(6) and 
the Twombly-Iqbal Shift in Pleading Policy 22 (August 29, 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138428.  Among cases that actually have Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
filed, the grant rate can be zero, 100%, or any percentage in between.”).  For more on the 
methodological import of Shavell’s critique of Priest and Klein, see Gelbach, supra, at 23-
24, which provides a simple explanation of why DE models are consistent with any win rate 
between zero and one—thus undermining the view that Shavell’s demonstration in an 
asymmetric information model is a per se reason to reject use of DE models. 
151. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 339 n.141 (citing Samuel R. Gross and Kent D. 
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for 
Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 341 (1991)). 
152. Gross & Syverud, supra note 151, at 341. 
153. Gross & Syverud, supra note 151, at 341. 
154. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 39 n.141 (citing Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, 
Trial Selection Theory and Evidence: A Review (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 
09:27, May 20, 2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship 
/workingpapers/2009.html). 
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bution of case quality, that Priest & Klein’s model does.  None of the criticisms 
from the literature that Cecil cites applies to my model, because not one of the 
results demonstrated in the papers he cites is inconsistent with any prediction 
my model makes. 
2.  Are there major problems with the model’s behavioral assumptions? 
Cecil argues that economic models “are closely tethered to the assumptions 
that underlie their development” and expresses concerns about a number of the 
expositional assumptions that I make in sketching the model underlying Lock-
ing the Doors.155  He lists the following supposedly problematic assumptions: 
o “Rule 12(b)(6) is the only type of MTD that can be filed”;156 
o “when MTDs are granted, they are always granted without leave to 
amend;”157 
o “each case involves a single claim”;158 
o “each case involves a single plaintiff and a single defendant.”159 
Cecil’s contention evinces a misreading of Locking the Doors and a mis-
understanding of the role these assumptions play not only in that paper’s analy-
sis, but also, by extension, in behavioral modeling in general.  As I shall dis-
cuss, the role of the assumptions Cecil criticizes is expositional,160 rather than 
substantive: these assumptions function not to restrict the set of qualitative out-
comes that must be dealt with, but rather to sharpen and focus the methodologi-
cal discussion. 
a.  Other Rule 12(b) motions 
As Cecil notes, Rule 12(b) does allow other bases for dismissal.  But when 
Cecil interprets the FJC data as he prefers to do, he does not worry that the two 
FJC reports he co-authored also ignore these other motions.  Of course that fact 
does not imply that Cecil has made assumptions inconsistent with his data: it 
simply suggests that he and his co-authors made the reasonable, simplifying as-
sumption that Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice could usefully be examined with-
out also examining behavior that, on balance, is mostly extraneous.  Needless 
to say, though, if ignoring other motions to dismiss is a problem for my ap-
                                                
155. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 39. 
156. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 40. 
157. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 40. 
158. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 40. 
159. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 40. 
160. At the outset of methodological discussion in Locking the Doors, I stated that “I 
shall rely on a number of simplifying assumptions for the sake of exposition,” Locking the 
Doors, supra note 17, at 2296 (emphasis added). 
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proach, it can hardly be less of one for Cecil.161 
b.  Leave to amend 
As I stated in Locking the Doors, “[i]t is straightforward, but . . . somewhat 
complicated algebraically, to extend the model to account for grants with leave 
to amend.”162  I stated further that when I considered an extended model that 
does allow for grants with leave to amend, “the main qualitative results are un-
affected.”163  As I discuss supra,164 FJC data that I actually use in my empirical 
work codes whether plaintiffs or defendants ultimately “prevail” on claims 
challenged in Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  As noted supra,165 the FJC’s updated re-
port explains that “[w]e identified cases in which the movant prevailed as those 
in which the court granted the last motion to dismiss in whole or in part and no 
opportunity to amend the complaint remained.”166  My expositional assumption 
that motions are granted without leave to amend thus corresponds well to the 
FJC data I use, because both the assumption and the actual data concern the 
situation in which the motion to dismiss ultimately is dispositive.167  The only 
exception to this correspondence involves the issue of “Type Z” cases, which I 
raise de novo in section III.G.2, infra. 
c.  Multiple claims 
It is straightforward to make simple modifications to the conceptual appa-
ratus in section A, supra, in order to incorporate the possibility that a plaintiff 
has multiple claims. 
Note first that only cases in which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are granted in-
volve negatively affected cases.  To account for the possibility of multiple-
                                                
161. And while we’re listing features of civil litigation that Cecil and co-authors (rea-
sonably!) didn’t consider important enough to collect data for a study related to changes in 
the pleading standards, why stop with Rule 12(b)?  How about Rule 12(e), Rule 11, and Rule 
41—and why not let the common law in on the action and consider motions to dismiss for 
forum non conveniens?  (See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 54 U.S. 235 (1981).)  No one 
reasonably would or should suggest that cases must be coded for all these pleading-related 
rules and doctrines. 
162. Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2306 n.133. 
163. See id.  There I cited to an earlier version of Gelbach, Selection in Motion, supra 
note 17.  I have since decided that the relevant game-theoretic discussion isn’t worth the 
candle, because it is long and technical and provides no additional qualitative insights.  Thus 
this discussion no longer appears in that paper. 
164. See section D, supra.  
165. See section D, supra.  
166. FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 3. 
167. The idea of using the updated report’s data on the rate at which movants pre-
vail—rather than making arbitrary assumptions about party behavior following a grant with 
leave to amend—was not originally my own. In a bit of irony, I owe this idea to a suggestion 
made by Cecil himself.  E-mail from Joe Cecil to author, (Dec. 5, 2011 11:12:01 EST) (on 
file with author). 
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claim cases, define the outcomes of claims rather than of cases as “D”, “S”, 
“A”, or “M”, and similarly define M claims as MG or MD according to whether 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the claim in question would be granted 
or denied.  
Finally, observe that the advent of Twombly/Iqbal would negatively affect 
a plaintiff as to any given claim if such a change in pleading doctrine would 
cause the defendant to prevail on any of the plaintiff’s claims as a result of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
(i)  when the plaintiff would have faced and won such a motion as to 
that claim pre-Twombly (MDMG claims), 
 
(ii) when the defendant would file an answer rather than a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion as to that claim pre-Twombly, but the defendant would pre-
vail on the motion as to the claim following Twombly/Iqbal (AMG 
claims), or 
 
(iii)  when the plaintiff would secure a settlement from the defendant as 
to that claim pre-Twombly, but instead the claim would be termi-
nated by a defendant’s prevailing on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to 
the claim following Twombly/Iqbal (SMG claims). 
Now define a negatively affected plaintiff as a plaintiff who is negatively 
affected as to any claim.  With these refinements in hand, all the rest of my 
analysis goes through unchanged, because logic dictates that any plaintiff who 
is negatively affected as to a claim is negatively affected as to some claim.  
Thus, all that is necessary to adapt the definition of negatively affected cases to 
the reality of cases with multiple claims is a collection of straightforward, if 
word-dense, adjustments to the definitions I used in Locking the Doors.168 
d.  Multiple parties 
The final expositional assumption that Cecil suggests is important is my 
assumption that each case has a single plaintiff and a single defendant.  Now I 
will play the same game I played in the discussion of multiple claims: define 
the outcomes of claims by plaintiff pi against defendant dj as “D”, “S”, “A”, or 
“M”, and similarly define M claims as MG or MD according to whether the mo-
                                                
168. And this should not be a surprising conclusion, because Locking the Doors did 
not ignore the fact that the FJC-measured variables can involve multiple claims.  See, e.g., 
Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2330-31 (“It is important to emphasize that the FJC 
codes a movant as prevailing if she prevailed on any of the claims she challenged via an ini-
tial Rule 12(b)(6) MTD”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2331, n.177 (noting that “[t]he 
FJC could have instead coded movants as prevailing only if they prevailed on all claims 
challenged,” emphasizing this alternative approach). 
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tion to dismiss filed by whichever defendant filed it would be granted or denied 
as to the claim filed by whichever plaintiff filed it.  Now define a negatively 
affected plaintiff as a plaintiff who is negatively affected as to some claim filed 
against some defendant.  Once again all the rest of my analysis goes through 
unchanged, because logic dictates that any plaintiff who is negatively affected 
as to a claim filed against a defendant is negatively affected as to some claim 
filed against some defendant.  And so all that is necessary to adapt the defini-
tion of negatively affected cases to the reality of cases with multiple parties on 
“each side of the v” is a collection of definitional adjustments to the simpler 
exposition in Locking the Doors.  In sum, contra Cecil, the conceptual appara-
tus and the empirical implementation in Locking the Doors get on just fine.169 
3.  The Proper Unit of Analysis: Claims, Cases, or Plaintiffs? 
The empirical work in Locking the Doors and above considers a plaintiff to 
have been affected by a Rule 12(b)(6) grant whenever the Rule 12(b)(6) 
movant prevails as to one or more claims.  This is the definition of “prevailing 
movant” adopted by Cecil and co-authors in the updated report.170  Both Cecil 
and Engstrom challenge my reliance on this approach to measuring prevailing 
movants.  For example, Cecil writes that my “findings . . . extend[] only to 
cases where plaintiffs are denied the opportunity to settle or obtain access to 
discovery for at least one of what may be many claims in a case.”171  Of course 
that is true.172  And it is surely true that there are cases in which the termination 
of only one claim would be a minor affair.  Further, given Cecil’s apparent be-
lief that dismissals as to subsets of claims are unimportant, it is surprising that 
he and his co-authors collected so much data and reported so many results re-
lated to such dismissals.  But it isn’t hard to imagine examples of multiple-
claim cases in which a subset of claims would be quite important. 
Even so, Engstrom argues that my approach suffers from overinclusiveness 
because 
the grant-as-to-one-or-more-claims approach . . . sweeps in 12(b)(6) 
grants dismissing only some of the claims challenged in the motion, 
12(b)(6) grants of motions that challenged only some of the plaintiff’s 
claims in the first place, and 12(b)(6) grants liberating purely periph-
                                                
169. But see the discussion of “Type Z” cases in section III.G.2, infra. 
170. See Tables A-1 and A-2 of the updated report, supra note 33, at 7-8. 
171. Cecil, Waves, supra note 13, at 39-40. 
172. I noted this point in Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2330-31 (“It is impor-
tant to emphasize that the FJC codes a movant as prevailing if she prevailed on any of the 
claims she challenged via an initial Rule 12(b)(6) [motion]”), immediately followed by foot-
note stating that “[t]he FJC could have instead coded movants as prevailing only if they pre-
vailed on all claims challenged,” id. at 2331. 
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eral defendants in multidefendant cases.”173 
Engstrom then offers an alternative approach: 
Plugging the FJC Second Study’s estimates of the post-Twiqbal 
change in the rate at which 12(b)(6) orders entirely dismissed one or 
more plaintiffs from the litigation into Gelbach’s selection-accounting 
framework yields a lower “negatively affected” share for all three case 
types he examines, from 15.4% to 10.8% in job discrimination cases, 
from 18.1% to 4.4% in civil rights cases, and from 21.5% to 11.3% 
among “Total Other” case types.174 
It is important to understand what Engstrom is and isn’t claiming here.  
First, Engstrom is not suggesting that I have somehow miscalculated the object 
of my proposed inquiry, which is a lower bound on the share of post-Iqbal 
cases that faced Rule 12(b)(6) motions in which plaintiffs were negatively af-
fected on at least one claim.  Instead, Engstrom is suggesting that we should be 
answering a different question175—a lower bound on the share of such cases in 
which plaintiffs were totally dismissed from litigation.176  I disagree with Eng-
strom on this point, but for the sake of discussion I shall leave that disagree-
ment aside.  As I shall now show, Engstrom’s preferred measure is unreliable 
on its own terms, due to a missing data problem.  The problem is that the data 
necessary to properly calculate Engstrom’s preferred measure do not exist.  The 
estimates Engstrom reports are likely biased downward, possibly by substantial 
magnitudes.  It is possible, however, to construct alternative estimates that do 
not suffer from this problem by looking at only those cases in which a plaintiff 
loses at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage (thereby excluding from the denominator those 
cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was filed but in which the defendant 
didn’t prevail, however prevailing is measured).  When I construct these esti-
mates, I find that both Engstrom’s approach and mine yield the conclusion that 
Twombly and Iqbal negatively affected plaintiffs in a substantial share of cases 
considered. 
a.  The “wrong denominator” problem 
Engstrom first calculates what I shall call the “dismissed plaintiff” share, 
among all cases coded for the updated report: 
 
                                                
173. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1227.  As I shall discuss, the existence of Engstrom’s 
second category here—”motions that challenged only some of the plaintiff’s claims in the 
first place”—renders his own proposed alternative unworkable, due to a lack of data. 
174. Id. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
176. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1228 (“Gelbach’s and my estimates do not differ be-
cause of something in the way the statistical analysis is performed. . . . Rather, we are meas-
uring different quantities of interest.”). 
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(4) DPS =  
Number of Cases in which Plaintiff Entirely Dismissed 
Number of Cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion was Filed 
 
He then inserts the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal values of this dismissed 
plaintiff share into formula (3), supra, using the same motion-filing data that I 
used to estimate m.  Engstrom’s dismissed plaintiff share values are considera-
bly lower than what they replace, i.e., the share of cases in which the movant 
prevails on one or more claims, i.e., formula (3)’s denominator.  For example, 
in 2006, the FJC’s data show there were only forty-three civil rights cases in 
which a plaintiff was dismissed as a result of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; this indi-
cates a dismissed plaintiff share of 25.4% among all cases with a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion coded.  This is a much lower frequency than the 58.6% of the time that 
movants in these same 169 cases prevailed on one or more claims.177  The 
number Engstrom uses for his dismissed plaintiff share denominator is the total 
number of cases in which the updated report’s authors coded the outcome of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  But the appropriate number would be the subset of these 
cases in which a plaintiff could possibly have been eliminated. 
 To understand the importance of this “wrong denominator” problem, con-
sider a simple example, illustrated in Table 3.  The first row of this table indi-
cates that there are 100 cases in which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are filed.  Of 
these 100 cases, there are sixty in which the Rule 12(b)(6) motion could not 
possibly eliminate a plaintiff entirely, even if all requested relief were granted 
(row (b)).  There are another forty cases in which the motion could eliminate a 
plaintiff entirely (row (e)).  There are three types of cases in which the movant 
prevails as to at least one claim: those in which the movant prevails on at least 
one claim, given that the motion couldn’t possibly eliminate a plaintiff entirely 
(row (c)); those in which the movant prevails on at least one claim but not on 
enough claims to eliminate a plaintiff entirely, among cases in which the mo-
tion could possibly eliminate a plaintiff entirely (row (f)); and those in which 
the movant could and in fact does prevail on enough claims to eliminate a 
plaintiff entirely (row (g)). 
In terms of this example, my preferred approach both here and in Locking 
the Doors is to say that the movant prevails in 55% of cases: twenty-five row 
(c) cases, plus five row (f) cases, plus 25 row (g) cases, divided by 100 row (a) 
cases in total.  An approach that considers plaintiffs to be negatively affected 
by Twombly and Iqbal only if they are entirely eliminated should instead de-
termine that the movant prevails in 62.5% of cases: twenty-five row (g) cases in 
which the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted as to all of a plaintiff’s claims, di-
vided by the forty row (e) cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion actually chal-
lenges all of a plaintiff’s claims.  But the approach Engstrom actually used 
would involve something different here.  His approach amounts to (correctly) 
                                                
177. FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 11. 
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taking the twenty-five row (g) cases, and then (incorrectly) dividing this num-
ber by the 100 row (a) cases overall, resulting in a reported dismissed plaintiff 
share of 25%. 
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Table 3: Illustrating the Wrong-Denominator Problem 
   
Total number of cases filed: 100 (a) 
   
Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges only some 
claims: 60 (b) 
Granted as to at least one challenged claim: 25 (c) 
Denied as to all challenged claims: 35 (d) 
   
Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges all claims: 40 (e) 
Granted as to at least one claim, but not as to all:  5 (f) 
Granted as to all claims: 25 (g) 
Denied as to all claims: 10 (h) 
 
This example shows two important things.  First, Engstrom’s approach can 
lead to substantial downward bias in measuring the frequency with which 
plaintiffs are entirely dismissed as a result of Rule 12(b)(6) motions, among 
cases in which they could be; his approach would yield a share of 25%, 
whereas the correct share would be 62.5%.  To deal with this problem, each 
dismissed plaintiff share that Engstrom actually uses would have to be inflated 
to account for the fact that only some of the motions coded by the FJC authors 
are relevant to Engstrom’s desired analysis.  For example, in the hypo just 
above, the proper inflation factor is 2.5—the ratio of the total number of mo-
tions coded to the number that Engstrom would have to use to measure what he 
wants to measure.  In an ideal world, I would calculate the appropriate inflation 
factors and correct Engstrom’s calculations.  But neither FJC report provides 
any information that could be used to measure the number of cases with Rule 
12(b)(6) motions that could have eliminated a plaintiff entirely.178  Conse-
                                                
178. The initial report tells us how many cases had a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed 
against them within ninety days of case filing.  See FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 5. 
And the updated report tells us the number of cases in which the authors coded the results of 
orders adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  See FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 3. 
But so far as I can tell, neither report offers a single datum on the number of cases in which a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, had it been granted as to all claims the defendant challenged, could 
have eliminated that plaintiff entirely.  This fact may be a consequence of the way the FJC 
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quently, the alternative lower bound estimates that Engstrom reports cannot 
mea ingfully be compared to the lower bounds reported in Locking the Doors. 
The second useful thing that Table 3’s example shows is that the share of 
cases in which (i) plaintiffs are entirely eliminated due to a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, among all cases in which they could possibly be so eliminated, can exceed 
the share of cases in which (ii) plaintiffs lose one or more claims, among all 
cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is filed.  In other words, there is nothing 
inherent in my preferred approach that suggests it should lead to greater esti-
mates than one would get with a proper application of Engstrom’s proposed 
approach. 
b.  A feasible alternative version of Engstrom’s approach yields results 
that buttress the qualitative conclusions in Locking the Doors 
In this subpart I suggest a valid alternative that incorporates Engstrom’s 
suggestion to count only dismissed plaintiffs as having been negatively affected 
by Twombly/Iqbal.  This alternative does not involve computing a lower bound 
on the share of negatively affected plaintiffs among those cases in which de-
fendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions post-Iqbal.  Instead, it involves computing 
a lower bound on the negatively affected share in post-Twombly/Iqbal cases 
whose defendants actually prevail on all claims necessary to eliminate one or 
more plaintiffs.  To calculate this alternative measure, one must replace the 
number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed, in the denominator of equation (2),179 
with the number of cases in which a plaintiff is eliminated.  Thus, the formula 
for this alternative measure of the negatively affected share is: 
 
(5) LB Among Eliminated Plaintiffs = 
Change in Number of Cases in which Plaintiff is Eliminated 
# of post- Iqbal Cases in which Plaintiff is Eliminated 
 
Notice that the measure in formula 5 involves only data from the updated report 
concerning the number of dismissed plaintiffs.  Consequently, unlike  
Engstrom’s desired but unmeasured object of interest, formula (5) does not re-
quire knowing how many Rule 12(b)(6) motions could have eliminated one or 
more plaintiffs, had they been granted.180 
                                                                                                             
authors conducted the outcomes study: they coded orders resolving Rule 12(b)(6) motions, 
but not the motions themselves.  To the extent that one might be able to discern from the 
FJC-coded order that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion could have eliminated a plaintiff entirely, the 
FJC authors appear not to have coded for that variable.  See FJC INITIAL REPORT, supra note 
33, at 42 (Figure C-1, “Code Sheet for Recording Action on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion”) (listing 
no variables related to the issue in question). 
179. See supra text just following note 126. 
180. In footnote 84, at 1228, Engstrom reports measures of such lower bounds that are 
analogous to those generated by formula (5) in the text just above.  He calculates these esti-
mates by taking the ratio of his earlier-discussed estimates to his dismissed plaintiff share (I 
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 In the first column of Table 4, I repeat the lower bound estimates I reported 
in Locking the Doors.  In the second column, I report estimated lower bounds 
based on formula (5)—that is, lower bounds calculated by implementing Eng-
strom’s preferred approach of counting only entirely dismissed plaintiffs as 
negatively affected, while using as the denominator the number of post-Iqbal 
cases in which a plaintiff is eliminated.  In the table’s second column, I report 
estimates of still another lower bound estimand, given by formula (6):181 
 
(6) LB Among Plaintiffs Losing on One or More Claims = 
 
Change in Number of Cases in which Plaintiff Loses on One or More Claims 
# of post- Iqbal Cases in which Plaintiff Loses on One or More Claims 
 
 The formula (6) alternative approach uses my preferred coding of which 
plaintiffs are negatively affected—including those who lose on any claims, not 
just those who are entirely eliminated.  As with formula (5), it then uses as the 
denominator only those plaintiffs considered as losing post-Iqbal (rather than 
all those plaintiffs who face some type of Rule 12(b)(6) motion post-Iqbal, as 
in formulas (2) and (3)).  Thus, unlike the main estimates reported in Eng-
strom’s paper and my main estimates in Locking the Doors, the lower bound 
estimates based on formulas (5) and (6) can be used to form a meaningful com-
parison of the importance of the which-plaintiffs-really-lose issue that Eng-
strom raises. 
The table shows that Engstrom’s preferred measure of the outcome of Rule 
12(b)(6) motions—dismissed plaintiffs only—yields lower bounds that are sub-
stantial in magnitude in all cases.  Indeed, they exceed those in Locking the 
Doors by substantial amounts for two of the three case categories, and they are 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level for employment discrimination cases 
and at better than level 0.001 for the contract, tort, and “other” cases.  The 
comparable estimates using the alternative approach to defining losing plain-
tiffs based on formula (6) are also substantial, and two of the three are statisti-
cally significant at level 0.01 or better. 
In sum, both the formula (5) Engstrom approach and my preferred formula 
(6) alternative yield conclusions in line with the findings reported in Locking 
                                                                                                             
did something similar in Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2335).  Like my main ap-
proach in Locking the Doors, this approach uses formula (3)—so that it combines data from 
the initial report’s filing study and the updated report’s outcomes study.  But otherwise, this 
approach functionally eliminates the problem of the wrong number of filed motions, because 
that wrong number appears in both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio in ques-
tion here.  Because it will be convenient for comparison’s sake, I shall use formula (5) in-
stead of the approach Engstrom takes in his footnote 84. 
181. Note that in terms of the example in Table 3, this formula is equivalent to one mi-
nus a ratio whose numerator is the sum of the numbers of post-Iqbal cases in rows (c), (f), 
and (g), and whose denominator is the sum of the same numbers of cases during the pre-
Twombly period. 
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the Doors:182 a substantial share of the plaintiffs considered in each case type 
must have been negatively affected—regardless of whether we focus on the set 
of all plaintiffs whose cases were challenged via Rule 12(b)(6), or on only the 
subset of these plaintiffs who lost in the face of such a challenge. 
 
                                                
182. The statistical insignificance of the Engstrom-approach civil rights estimate and 
the Gelbach-approach employment discrimination estimate reflects both the fact that these 
are the smallest estimates for each of the two approaches and the fact that the numbers of 
cases included—the respective values of N, as defined in note , infra—are relatively small.  
This is especially clear by comparison to the p-values reported in the first column of Table 4, 
because these p-values are based on an estimate that incorporates information on many more 
cases (see Appendix B of Locking the Doors, available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach_appendix_b.pdf, for more). 
284 STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [Vol. 2:2 
 
Table 4: How Does the Choice of “Losing Plaintiff” Definition Affect the 
Lower Bounds? 
Comparing the Engstrom and Gelbach Approaches 











    
























    
a Source: Lower bound point estimates are from Locking the Doors, Table 
6, at 2334; p-values are from Appendix B, Table 2, available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach_appendix_b.pdf. 
b Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Table B-1 of the updated 
report, at 11. 
c Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Table A-1 of the updated 
report, at 7. For comparability with Engstrom’s calculations, civil rights cases 
include ADA-related cases; these cases are excluded from consideration in 
Locking the Doors. 
G.  Potential Confounding Factors, and a Previously Unnoted Data Issue 
In responding above to specific criticisms made by Cecil and Engstrom, I 
mean to suggest neither that no substantive assumptions are required nor that 
the FJC data are perfect.  In this section I first discuss the need for behavioral 
                                                
183. To calculate p-values, first observe that if there are G2010 and G2006 randomly gen-
erated cases in which the plaintiff loses, however this outcome is defined, then the total 
number of cases with a losing plaintiff is N=G2010+G2006.  Under the null hypothesis that no 
cases were negatively affected, G2010 and G2006 should be the same up to random error. That 
means the probability that a randomly drawn losing-plaintiff case comes from 2010 must 
equal one-half.  A one-sided test of the null hypothesis that there were no negatively affected 
plaintiffs among those in which the plaintiff lost on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion post-Iqbal can 
then be based on tabulations of the binomial cumulative distribution with N trials and suc-
cess probability ½.  Each p-value reported in Table 4 is the probability that there will be no 
more than G2010-1 successes in a N Bernoulli trials with equal probability of success and fail-
ure.  See Appendix B to Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach_appendix_b.pdf, for certain addi-
tional, and subtle, conceptual issues related to sampling error. 
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assumptions to rule out the possibility that other changes, unrelated to pleading 
standard changes, account for my empirical results.  I then discuss the implica-
tions of a quirk of the FJC data that was previously unnoted. 
1.  Ruling Out Confounding Factors 
One assumption necessary to justify the approach in Locking the Doors is 
that the composition of disputes that actually occur in the post-Iqbal period is 
not importantly different from the composition of disputes that would have oc-
curred in this period if Twombly and Iqbal had never happened.  Roughly 
speaking, this is equivalent to assuming that Twombly and Iqbal were the only 
causes of the differences in the numbers of cases and Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
filed, and in adjudication of those Rule 12(b)(6) motions that were filed. 
I discussed this point in some detail in Locking the Doors, where I noted 
that if, for example, the underlying number of disputes grows at a fixed annual 
rate, then using the FJC data as I do would lead me to overstate the second 
component given in equation (3)’s lower bound formula.  As I wrote in Locking 
the Doors, this would cause “the number of MTDs filed in the Iqbal period [to] 
rise simply due to the passage of time, rather than because of party selection 
effects.”184  As I also wrote,  
[p]erhaps some of the increase in the number of MTDs filed in employ-
ment discrimination and civil rights cases might come from such an ex-
ogenous growth source.  But it seems very unlikely that exogenous 
growth in controversies can explain much of the lower bound for the total 
other cases nature-of-suit category.  For this category, the rate at which 
MTDs were filed increased from 3.1% to 5.0% of case filings, which is 
more than a 60% increase, while the overall number of cases filed in the 
total other cases category actually fell slightly between 
the 2006 and 2010 study periods.185 
In addition, as I also noted in Locking the Doors,186 it is possible that pri-
mary behavior responded to perceived changes in the pleading standard in the 
period between the 2006 and 2010.  Such changes could affect my results by 
changing the number of controversies that arise in the first place.  As just one 
example, large employers, who are likely to be repeat-play defendants, might 
                                                
184. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2336. 
185. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2336 (footnotes deleted) (including 
footnote observing that “[o]ne interesting possibility is that case filings respond to the busi-
ness cycle, which swung down substantially between 2005-2006 and 2009-2010” and citing 
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Dis-
putes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 427, 427-62 (1995) (concerning the cyclical aspects of employment discrimi-
nation litigation)). 
186. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2336. 
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expect to face reduced litigation expenses related to (either real or simply al-
leged) employment discrimination incidents.  That would reduce the costs of 
actual discrimination, as well as of non-discriminatory actions that might be 
perceived as discrimination.  In turn, this might lead to an increase in the num-
ber of lawsuits filed by comparison to the number that would be filed post-
Iqbal were primary behavior unchanged.  In the presence of such feedback ef-
fects, my results would need to be reinterpreted—of course, the same would be 
true of results generated by other researchers using before-and-after data. 
Sometimes confounding factors can be addressed empirically using control 
or proxy variables.187  Other problematic stories have no happy statistical end-
ing; for example, it seems likely that, as a general matter, it would be very dif-
ficult to hold primary behavior constant statistically.  As I wrote in Locking the 
Doors, “[o]ne of the facts of life for nonexperimental empirical research . . . is 
that there are always such potential counterexplanations.”188  This is another 
way of stating the point that un-testable assumptions are an unavoidable part of 
empirical work.189 
2.  “Type Z” Disputes 
One qualification to the empirical analysis and implementation in the fore-
going sections of this Part is necessary due to a quirk in the FJC data.  The FJC 
authors’ coding scheme treats the movant as prevailing when the parties settle 
after a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted with leave to amend (such settlement 
could occur either before the deadline for the plaintiff to file an amended com-
plaint, or after the plaintiff files an amended complaint but before the defendant 
files a new Rule 12(b)(6) motion).  A preferable coding approach would have 
coded directly for whether a settlement occurred. It is worth asking how this 
feature of the data affects my results. 
The typology outlined in Locking the Doors and further developed supra 
does not account for such a nuance.  To do so, I introduce an additional poten-
tial outcome, “Z,” to capture cases in which the parties settle following a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion’s grant with leave to amend, but before all possibility of 
                                                
187. For example, with access to the FJC’s micro-data, one could estimate the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion-filing rate in a model that includes business cycle-related variables such as 
the unemployment rate, retail sales data, or some other measure that might help account for 
macroeconomic variation. 
188. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2337. 
189. Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 929 (2011), have recently argued that where possible, applicability of alterna-
tive legal rules should be randomized in order to facilitate measurement of policies’ effects.  
As has long been understood in statistics and the social sciences, random assignment can 
eliminate confounding factors.  On the other hand (as Abramowicz, Ayres and Listokin 
note), randomization is not always feasible, and it does have drawbacks.  For a general dis-
cussion, see James J. Heckman and Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experi-
ments, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1995)).  In the civil procedure context, it seems plausible that 
some of these drawbacks could be substantial. 
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amending the complaint expires.  Consider a dispute that would have a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion filed and denied pre-Twombly (a Type MD dispute) but in 
which, following Twombly/Iqbal, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be filed and 
granted with leave to amend, after which the parties would settle before the 
deadline for the plaintiff to file an amended complaint (a Type Z dispute).  To 
extend my taxonomy of pairs of potential outcomes under the two pleading 
standards, I shall refer to this dispute as having Type MDZ. 
Given the possible existence of Type Z cases, the updated report’s defini-
tion of prevailing movant would include cases of Types ZZ, AZ, SZ, MDZ, and 
MGZ in one or both of the periods.  Because Type ZZ disputes will be coded as 
having movants prevail under both pleading standards, they are eliminated 
from my lower bound calculation when one subtracts the number of cases in 
which movants prevailed in the pre-Twombly period from the corresponding 
number in the post-Iqbal period, so they are unproblematic.  And disputes of 
Type AZ can reasonably be viewed as involving negatively affected plaintiffs, 
so they also do not affect my conclusions.190 
Among post-Iqbal cases with prevailing movants, that leaves only disputes 
of Type SZ, MGZ, and MDZ.  If some of these disputes would not involve plain-
tiffs who are negatively affected by the change in the pleading standard, as I 
define this concept supra, then using the updated report’s data as I do could 
overstate the number of negatively affected plaintiffs.191  The updated report 
provides some limited data that can be used to get a handle on the relevance of 
such Type Z cases.  Because the details are tedious, I relegate them to the Ap-
pendix.  But the take-away point of the analysis there is that, under the scenario 
in which Type Z disputes make the greatest possible difference to my results, 
                                                
190. Consider a Type A dispute—which is one whose defendant answers, rather than 
settling (or filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).  Since the parties do not settle this dispute pre-
answer/motion to dismiss, the plaintiff in such a case must expect her net gain from filing 
suit and litigating post-answer to be greater than cost the defendant expects from litigating 
post-answer.  Now assume that Twombly and Iqbal affect neither the defendant’s expected 
post-answer cost of litigating nor the plaintiff’s expected post-answer gain from litigating 
(this is reasonable since Twombly/Iqbal affect only the chances of getting past the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage).  Now consider a Type AZ dispute.  When the parties agree on a settlement 
under Iqbal after some Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the plaintiff gives up her opportunity 
to file an amended complaint, and the defendant gives up her opportunity to file an answer in 
response to such a complaint.  Thus the settlement amount must be no greater than the de-
fendant’s expected post-answer costs of litigating, which (by reasonable assumption) is the 
same under Twombly/Iqbal as under Conley.  But we have seen that in a Type AZ dispute 
occurring under Conley, the plaintiff’s expected net gain from filing suit and litigating post-
answer would exceed the defendant’s expected post-answer costs of litigating. Putting all 
this together establishes that the amount for which a Type AZ dispute settles under 
Twombly/Iqbal must be less than the plaintiff’s expected net gain from filing suit and litigat-
ing post-answer.  In other words, the plaintiff in a Type AZ dispute does worse, as of the 
post-answer/motion to dismiss stage of litigation, under Twombly/Iqbal than under Conley. 
191 To see this point, observe that formula (2)’s numerator can be written as the sum of 
(i) Type Z cases in which the defendant prevails post-Iqbal and (ii) the number of non-Type 
Z cases in which the defendant prevails, minus (iii) the number of pre-Twombly cases in 
which defendants prevail on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  
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my lower bounds each would also fall by roughly 5 percentage points.  Such 
changes are not trivial, but they also would not have meaningfully altered the 
principal qualitative empirical conclusions I drew in Locking the Doors.  To 
demonstrate, consider a slight edit of my summary of these conclusions in the 
introduction to Locking the Doors: 
For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, switching from 
Conley to Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected plaintiffs in at least [10] 
% and at least [13]% of cases, respectively, that faced MTDs in the 
Iqbal period.  Among cases not involving civil rights, employment dis-
crimination, or financial instruments, Twombly/Iqbal negatively af-
fected at least [16]% of plaintiffs facing MTDs in the Iqbal study pe-
riod.  These results tell us that Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected a 
sizable share of those plaintiffs who actually faced MTDs in the post-
Iqbal period that the FJC studies.192 
The only edits to this text (besides removed footnotes) involve the re-
placement of the original lower bound figures with the worst-case scenario 
ones just discussed.  Thus my basic conclusion—that “Twombly/Iqbal nega-
tively affected a sizable share of those plaintiffs who actually faced MTDs in 
the post-Iqbal period” — persists with the worst-case scenario figures. 
Moreover, that is the worst-case scenario, which easily might not hold.  
Presumably in some of the cases in which plaintiffs could have submitted an 
amended complaint but did not, the plaintiffs simply gave up after determining 
that an amended complaint was unlikely enough to make a difference.193  And 
some of the cases presumably were Type ZZ cases—ones whose resolution was 
unaffected by Twombly/Iqbal194 — or Type AZ cases, whose plaintiffs are 
negatively affected by Twombly/Iqbal.  In the Appendix, I provide a set of as-
sumptions that do not seem extreme, under which lower bound estimates that 
would account for Type Z disputes work out to be about 2-3 percentage points 
lower than the conceptually appropriate ones—roughly half the size of the 
worst-case effects.  In sum, accounting for the presence of Type Z disputes 
does not alter the basic conclusions in Locking the Doors. 
CONCLUSION 
Empirical scholarship on civil procedure—especially involving changes in 
litigation rules—is often motivated by normatively important questions.  But 
                                                
192. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2278-2279 (footnotes deleted). 
193. Thus, such cases would not be Type Z cases at all, since they do not involve a 
settlement having any value to the plaintiff—rather, they would best be considered Type MG 
cases. 
194. The updated report’s coding scheme would include Type ZZ cases as “movant 
prevails” cases in both the 2006 and 2010 periods.  So while plaintiffs in these cases are not 
negatively affected, these cases do not affect the properly calculated negatively affected 
share, because they drop out in the numerator of formula (3), supra. 
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empirical researchers will fail even to begin to answer many such questions un-
less they take seriously the fact that litigation involves human beings, who not 
only are motivated, but also have the ability to react to policy changes that af-
fect the implications of their actions—in a word, agency.  Consequently, it is 
critical to develop a behavioral framework when seeking to understand the em-
pirical effects of developments that might alter the functioning of the civil jus-
tice system.  In this paper, I have focused on these issues using the lens of 
Twombly, Iqbal, and contemporary debates concerning the federal civil plead-
ing standard.  Researchers in this literature have failed, writ large, to explain in 
behaviorally cognizable terms why they keep calculating changes in measures 
of the grant rate. 
This paper revisits my own earlier work, showing how this continuing pre-
occupation with changes in grant rates is dually problematic.  First, because 
parties can be expected to change their behavior in response to perceived 
changes in the pleading standard, grant rate changes do not identify judicial be-
havior effects (which seem to be the conceptual object of interest to research-
ers).  Second, even if judicial behavior effects could, somehow, be identified, 
they are only part of the normatively relevant story of pleading standard 
changes.  My own approach, while only a partial solution, does not suffer from 
these shortcomings, because it takes party selection into account. 
An additional contribution of this Article comes in its response to two 
types of criticisms of my earlier work.  Some of the criticism has been directed 
at the very idea of model-guided empirical research—in the realm of empirical 
civil procedure research, this means a rejection of the idea of taking seriously 
parties’ status as motivated subjects, rather than assuming they are essentially 
inanimate objects drawn from an urn.  The basis of this criticism, though, is a 
misunderstanding of what is and is not involved in empirically implementing 
my behavioral framework.  Ironically, my proposed alternative requires fewer 
assumptions than the grant rate-focused approach others take.  A second type of 
criticism I address has to do with one aspect of my empirical implementation; 
both my methods and results survive a detailed reckoning with this criticism, 
too.195 
I shall close this paper with the observation that empirical questions in civil 
procedure are too important to be answered as if people ignored changes in im-
portant incentives when choosing when and how to litigate.  Parties don’t con-
duct their primary behavior that way, lawyers don’t plead or brief that way, 
and, one assumes, judges don’t decide cases that way.  So we ought not to 
study litigation that way, either.  We ought to study the civil justice system as it 
is: composed of human beings who might well respond to incentives. 
                                                
195. In Gelbach, Can We Learn Anything About Pleading Changes From Existing 
Data?, supra note 143, I respond in detail to other criticisms related to the empirical imple-
mentation in Locking the Doors. 
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APPENDIX: A ROUGH GUIDE TO THE EMPIRICAL IMPORTANCE OF TYPE Z 
DISPUTES 
The updated report explains that Rule 12(b)(6) motions were granted with 
leave to amend in 143 cases in the report’s 2006 period and 400 cases in its 
2010 period.196  Figures in the updated report indicate that in 39%, or 56, of 
these 2006 cases, the plaintiff did not submit an amended complaint; among 
2010 cases, plaintiffs did not amend in 34%, or 136, of these cases.  The sce-
nario in which the results reported in Locking the Doors deviate as much as 
possible from the correct lower bound, is the one in which all of the latter 
group of cases—all 136 cases that had a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted with 
leave to amend in the 2010 period and in which no amended complaint was 
submitted—were Type SZ or Type MZ cases in which the plaintiff was not 
negatively affected.197 
Unfortunately, the updated report does not separately report by case type 
the numbers of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted with leave to amend 
and no amended complaint filed.  I therefore assume that for each case type, the 
incidence of such cases is proportional to the total number of cases in the up-
dated report’s Table A-1.198  After eliminating from consideration the imputed 
numbers of 2010 period cases in which a plaintiff could have submitted an 
amended complaint following a grant with leave to amend, but did not so sub-
mit, I find that the 2010 grant rates would be roughly 5 percentage points lower 
for each of the three case types I consider.199  Under this worst-case scenario, 
                                                
196. FJC UPDATED REPORT, supra note 33, at 3. 
197. To see this fact, recall that the numerator of formula (3), supra, equals the change 
in the number of granted Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which is increasing in the number of 2010-
period cases with motions granted and decreasing in the number of 2006-period cases with 
motions granted.  Assuming that all the cases in question in the 2010 period involved plain-
tiffs that were not negatively affected, leads to the maximal reduction in the number of 2010-
period cases that enter this numerator. 
198. Table A-1 of the updated report indicates that the report includes data on a total of 
1,111 cases in the 2010 period.  Of these, 209 involve civil rights cases (here I include the 
updated report’s Table A-1 figures for civil rights cases, which include ADA cases, though 
they are excluded from Locking the Doors, because there is no way to determine the number 
of 2010 cases in which there was an opportunity to file an amended complaint but in which 
one was not filed), and an additional 113 involve employment discrimination cases, with  
599 cases involving my contract, tort, or “other” category (see Appendix A, Table 4 of Gel-
bach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2347).  The imputations resulting from my pro-
portionality assumption are that, of the 136 cases from the 2010 period in which an amended 
complaint could have been submitted but was not, 26 are civil rights cases 
(=136×(209÷1,111)), 14 are employment discrimination cases (=136×(113÷1,111)), and 65 
fall into my contract, tort or “other” category (=136×(599÷1,111)). 
199. For civil rights cases, the 2010 grant rate falls from 67.0% (=100%×140/209) to 
62.3% (=100%×(140-26)/(209-26)), a drop of 4.7 percentage points.  For employment dis-
crimination cases, the 2010 grant rate falls from 61.1% (=100%×69/113) to 55.6% 
(=100%×(69-14)/(113-14)), a drop of 5.5 percentage points.  For my contract, tort and 
“other” cases category, the updated report’s authors coded 337 cases as having the movant 
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my lower bounds each would also fall by this amount, yielding lower bounds of 
about 13% for civil rights cases, 10% for employment discrimination cases, and 
16% for my contract, tort, and “other” category. 
Such changes would not have meaningfully changed the principal qualita-
tive empirical conclusions I drew in Locking the Doors.  To demonstrate, con-
sider a slight edit or my summary of these conclusions in the introduction to 
Locking the Doors: 
For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, switch-
ing from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected plain-
tiffs in at least [10] % and at least [13]% of cases, respectively, 
that faced MTDs in the Iqbal period.  Among cases not involv-
ing civil rights, employment discrimination, or financial in-
struments, Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected at least [16]% of 
plaintiffs facing MTDs in the Iqbal study period.  These results 
tell us that Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected a sizable share 
of those plaintiffs who actually faced MTDs in the post-Iqbal 
period that the FJC studies.200 
The only edits (besides removed footnotes) involve the replacement of the 
original lower bound figures with the worst-case scenario ones just discussed.  
The basic conclusion—that “Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected a sizable share 
of those plaintiffs who actually faced MTDs in the post-Iqbal period”—persists 
with the worst-case scenario figures. 
And of course, all other situations are brighter than the worst case.  Pre-
sumably some of the cases in question—those in which plaintiffs could have 
submitted an amended complaint but did not involved plaintiffs who deter-
mined that an amended complaint was unlikely enough to make a difference 
that they just gave up.201  And some of the cases presumably were Type ZZ 
cases—ones whose resolution was unaffected by Twombly/Iqbal202—or Type 
AZ cases, whose plaintiffs are negatively affected by Twombly/Iqbal.  As just 
one example, suppose that half of the 136 cases in question in the 2010 period 
did involve negatively affected plaintiffs.  Then the 2010 grant rates based on 
the updated report’s coding scheme would be only 2-3 percentage points 
greater than the ones conceptually appropriate for use in my lower bound calcu-
                                                                                                             
prevail (see Appendix A, Table 4 of Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2347). The 2010 
grant rate thus falls from 56.3% (=100%×(337/599)) to 50.9% (=100%×(337-65)/(599-65)), 
a drop of 5.4 percentage points. 
200. Gelbach, Locking the Doors, supra note 17, at 2278-2279 (footnotes deleted). 
201. Such cases would not be Type Z cases at all. 
202. The updated report’s coding scheme would include Type ZZ cases as “movant 
prevails” cases in both the 2006 and 2010 periods, so while plaintiffs in these cases are not 
negatively affected, these cases do not affect the properly calculated negatively affected 
share. 





                                                
203. Under the assumption that the cases in question are proportionately distributed 
across case type, the reduction in the 2010 grant rate would be from 67.0% to 64.8% 
(=100%×(140-(½×26))/(209-(½×26))), for civil rights cases, a drop of 2.2 percentage points; 
for employment discrimination cases, the 2010 grant rate falls from 61.1% to 58.5% 
(=100%×(69-(½×14))/(113-(½×14))), a drop of 2.6 percentage points; for my contract, tort 
and “other” cases category, the 2010 grant rate falls from 56.3% to 53.8% (=100%×(337-
(½×65))/(599-(½×65))), a drop of 2.5 percentage points.   
